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SUMMARY
Chinese Internet users not only face the most technologically advanced filtering
system in the world, the Great Firewall of China, but also are under the watchful eyes
of the repressive government that controls every layer of their communications [19,
126]. Although social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter are blocked
in China, Chinese Internet users have the local replicas such as WeChat and Sina
Weibo to communicate with others [116]. However, these sites employ both advanced
keyword detection algorithms and human censors to filter any kind of “inappropriate”
content [61, 103]. While previous research has explored the technology behind the
censorship mechanisms [8, 61], little work has focused on the effects of censorship
on online and offline behaviors. In this thesis, I bridge this gap by conducting a
mixed-method study to gain a deeper understanding of these effects.
The results of the mixed-method study show that censorship has strong off-
platform effects, which are not detectable from usage logs. Users deliberately self-
censor their speech out of caution, because they do not have a clear understanding
of what content is being censored and what risks are associated with censorship on
Chinese social media. Although on-platform effects of censorship are present on social
media usage logs, they wear out over time. Informed by these results, I attempt to
provide social media users a better understanding of how the censorship mechanism
works and an effective censorship circumvention technique, both of which will lead to
greater freedom of expression among social media users.
Digital activists have long employed homophones of censored keywords to avoid
detection by keyword matching algorithms on Chinese social media [18, 47, 122,
125]. One part of this thesis demonstrates that it is possible to scale this technique
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up in ways that are costly and difficult to defend against because human censors
must manually read through all social media posts. Specifically, I developed a non-
deterministic algorithm for generating homophones that creates large numbers of false
positives for censors. In experiments, the algorithm allows homophone-transformed
posts to remain on Sina Weibo three times longer than their previously censored
counterparts without creating any confusion to native Chinese speakers.
Extrapolating from this work, I employed this algorithm in the development of
CENSE, a real-time system that Chinese social media users can use to easily de-
tect and replace censored keywords with homophones. The system consists of two
primary components: a back-end server and a front-end client. The back-end server
handles all logical operations in support of censorship circumvention—extracting cen-
sored keywords from Chinese social media and transforming them into corresponding
homophones. The front-end client automatically detects censored keywords on users’
social media posts and suggest corresponding homophones as replacements. The re-
sults of a formative interview study indicate a welcoming response from Chinese social
media users to the concept of a censorship circumvention tool.
Overall, the contributions of my research bridge the areas of Internet censorship
and censorship circumvention technologies. The mixed-method study provides a bet-
ter understanding of how censorship affects social media users. Additionally, the
homophone transformation algorithm and CENSE, a real-time censorship circumven-





The Internet has just recently surpassed newspapers and radios to become one of
the most popular sources of news and information [106]. However, not everyone in
the world has access to the same information, even though almost half of the world’s
population has access to the Internet [52]. Because the Internet has facilitated access
to information, repressive states across the world have imposed limitations on Internet
access on their citizens based on what the regimes regard as appropriate. This thesis
takes a closer look at China, the world’s most populous country.
With more than 721 million Internet users in China [52], the Chinese government
has developed one of the world’s most technologically advanced Internet filtering
system: the Great Firewall of China. Every packet of Internet traffic in and out of
the country is filtered to block specific sites and keywords [19]. While people in other
countries spend their daily leisure time on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other
popular Western social media, the Great Firewall restricts access to these Western
media, and Chinese Internet users frequent local replicas of these social networking
sites such as Sina Weibo, Renren, and WeChat as a part of their daily routines [116].
Although Chinese social media appears to contain much content on a variety of topics,
the government requires site operators to heavily censor inappropriate content by
using both advanced algorithms and human censors [61, 103].
Although previous research has explored the mechanisms underlying this censor-
ship [8, 61] and the ways Chinese social media users employ to circumvent them [18,
47, 122, 125], little is known about the effects censorship has on user’s social media
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Figure 1: Sina Weibo, the Chinese replica of Twitter, prohibits users to post sensitive
content on the site.
behaviors. Therefore, the first part of my thesis bridges this gap in the research lit-
erature by examining the user-level effects of censorship on Chinese social media. I
conducted a mixed-method study incorporating interviews with Chinese social media
users and analysis of Chinese social media user profiles to understand how users mod-
ify their online behaviors and contributions to Chinese social media in the presence
of censorship.
To combat Internet censorship, Chinese Internet users have employed several tech-
niques when posting to social media, including use of nicknames or morphs of sensitive
words and names of political figures, etc. In particular, my focus is on the techniques
Chinese Internet users employ to gain increased freedom of publication on Chinese
social media. As a part of this thesis, I developed an algorithm that computationally
generates homophones of keywords censored on Chinese social media. In experiments
conducted to test this algorithm, replacing censored keywords with the homophones
generated by the algorithm extended the life of a social media post by three times in
comparison to the post containing the original, censored keywords. I then further ex-
tended this algorithm into a real-time system that Chinese social media users can use
to circumvent censorship and gain a better understanding of the current censorship
2
situation on Chinese social media.
In this thesis, I organize my work into two categories: understanding the effects of
censorship on Chinese social media and circumventing censorship on Chinese social
media. Next, I give an introduction of my work in each of the two categories.
1.1 Understanding Censorship on Chinese Social Media
Although the research literature extensively documents the censorship practices on
Chinese Internet and Chinese social media [19, 23, 60, 61, 112], we do not know
how censorship affects the users. To extend our understanding of these effects, I
conducted a mixed-methods study to examine the user-level effects of censorship on
Chinese social media. Using the language of distributed cognition [48], I categorized
the effects into off-platform effects and on-platform effects. Off-platform effects, such
as self-censorship practices, are not present in user’s social media usage log. On
the other hand, on-platform effects can be directly observed from the social media
profiles such as reduction in subsequent speech and account abandonment after the
enactment of censorship.
I conducted both quantitative data analysis and an interview study to explore both
on- and off-platform effects of censorship on Chinese social media. In the quantitative
data analysis, I analyzed the profiles of more than 1.6 million Sina Weibo users, one
of the largest Chinese social media sites. 8,140 of these users were previously censored
on the platform. Since the log of social media profiles does not unveil the off-platform
effects of censorship, I interviewed 11 Chinese social media users to understand their
habits and behaviors in their social media routines.
The results of the matched sampling analysis show weak on-platform effects of
censorship. In the 30-day period around censorship, censored users reduced posting
activity by 3.91% more than the control group. In comparison to the 5-day pe-
riod around censorship where censored users’ posting activity drops 8.32% more than
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the control group, censorship causes short-term suppression of speech. Moreover, in
the 30-day period after censorship, the abandonment rate of accounts with censored
posts is only slightly more than accounts in the control group: 3.55% censored aban-
donment rate vs 1.33% control abandonment rate. This implies that although the
on-platform effects can be detected, they diminish over time. In contrast, I detected
strong off-platform effects. Interview participants reported that they cautiously self-
censor around political and sensitive topics due to unclear models of censorship and
uncertain associated risks.
The results of this study imply that while both off-platform and on-platform
effects certainly exist, on-platform effects are relatively small, and off-platform effects
are confined to “sensitive” content. It seems that if Chinese social media users have
a better understanding of the current situation of censorship on social media, they
will be better informed about what content is appropriate to post on social media,
rather than abundantly self-censoring out of caution. I see an opportunity to make
the censorship mechanism more transparent to users and, eventually, enable users to
circumvent censorship to achieve greater freedom of expression on social media. Next,
I introduce the next part of this thesis influenced by the results of this mixed-method
study.
1.2 Circumventing Censorship on Chinese Social Media
As documented by [19, 23, 60, 61, 112], the practice of censorship circumvention is
common among Chinese social media users. Unlike the English language, certain
properties of the Chinese language make constructing words that sound similar or
identical to other words, yet have completely different meanings, much easier. Chinese
social media users have used this characteristics of the Chinese language in strategies
to circumvent censorship on social media [18, 125]. For example, a river crab meme
that spread across Sina Weibo did not actually refer to river crabs. Rather, it stood
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for a protest against Internet censorship, as the word harmonize (和谐, pronounced
hé xié,), slang for censorship, is a homophone of the word for river crab (河蟹, pro-
nounced hé xiè) [125]. To date, no research has been conducted as to the effectiveness
of these strategies in circumventing censorship.
As a part of this thesis, I developed an algorithm that computationally generates
homophones of Chinese words and phrases. This algorithm permits the homophone
transformation technique to be transformed into a computational algorithm whose
implementation can help users circumvent censorship on Chinese social media. To
judge the effectiveness of my homophone generation algorithm, I conducted an ex-
periment that compared the life of Chinese social media posts that were transformed
using my algorithm with the original posts. In this experiment, the homophone trans-
formation technique extended the life of Chinese social media posts by three times in
comparison to the original, unaltered posts. Moreover, in another experiment with
Chinese native speakers, the homophone transformation did not confuse them. Fur-
thermore, I analyzed that the homophone transformation is costly for the censorship
adversaries to defend against, as automated detection of homophone transformations
can cause the censorship algorithm to over-censor regular social media posts.
Extrapolating from this work, I envisioned development of the algorithm into a
real-time system that will help Chinese social media users during their daily social
media routines. Consequently, I conducted a formative interview study with Chinese
social media users to assess whether a censorship circumvention system would be wel-
comed by such users. The results of the formative study were extremely encouraging,
and so I implemented my homophone transformation algorithm in a real-time system,
CENSE to allow Chinese social media users to apply the algorithm to social media
posts in real time.
The system consists of two components: a back-end server and a front-end server.
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The back-end system provides components that, working together, continuously mon-
itor for censored keywords on Chinese social media and then computationally generate
homophones of these keywords. At the same time, the front-end client unobtrusively
monitors the user’s post for censored keywords and suggests homophone replacement
suggestions when it detects them in the user’s post. Overall, the performance of the
CENSE system is remarkable, with no lags or latency in user interactions with the
system.
1.3 Research Contributions
This thesis contributes to the Social Computing research by providing a better un-
derstanding of how censorship affects users on social media, especially in the context
of Chinese social media. Consequently, user-level effects can translate to the effects
that censorship has on the social media platform. Additionally, this thesis also con-
tributes to the Social Computing Systems research area through the development
of an algorithm and a system that enable greater freedom of expression on Chinese
social media. More specifically, the contributions of this thesis are as follow:
1. An understanding of user-level effects of censorship on Chinese social
media. Through a mixed-method study, I found that censorship on Chinese so-
cial media cultivates implicit, off-platform effects on users. To put it differently,
the effects of censorship do not show through the usage log when analyzing social
media user profiles, but users are cautious of censorship when posting on social
media. However, the detectable, off-platform effects still exist as my analysis
shows a drop in participation right after users are censored, but these effects
are ephemeral. While previous research has revealed the mechanisms behind
censorship on Chinese social media, the understanding of user-level effects of
censorship is still unclear. My work is this thesis presents a unique perspective
and complement the research literature with the results of my study.
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2. An algorithm that computationally generates homophones of Chinese
words and circumvent censorship on Chinese social media. I developed
a non-deterministic algorithm that computationally generates homophones of
Chinese words. Combining this algorithm with a process to detect censored
keywords on Chinese social media using TF-IDF, replacing censored keywords
in social media posts with their homophones can extend the life of these posts
by three times in comparison to the original posts. Furthermore, Chinese native
speakers can still understand the content of the transformed posts. Additionally,
this technique incurs high cost to adversaries to defend against because human
censors are required to inspect these transformed posts manually. Through
experiments, my algorithm is proven to be effective in circumventing censorship
on Chinese social media.
3. A real-time system to circumvent censorship of Chinese social media.
Informed by the other parts of this thesis, I developed a real-time system to
circumvent censorship on Chinese social media. Besides the homophone trans-
formation algorithm and the censored keyword detection mentioned earlier, I
created a social media stream watcher to continuously monitor posts from Sina
Weibo. Together, these modules form a back-end server of the system that
detects up-to-date censored keywords on Chinese social media and suggests ho-
mophone replacements for these words. The other component of the system is
a Google Chrome extension as a front-end client. A formative study shows a
welcoming response to the idea of an automated censorship circumvention tool
from Chinese social media users. To the best of my knowledge, this system is
one of the first systems to encourage users to use a homophone substitution
technique to circumvent censorship on Chinese social media.
Altogether, this thesis bridges the gap between Internet censorship and censorship
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circumvention technologies by exploring how technology changes the perspectives and
behaviors of social media users under censorship. The knowledge contributed will
help inform future designs of social systems under censorship to minimize the effect
of regime-imposed censorship on users and social media platforms.
1.4 Thesis Overview
This thesis is organized into three main parts, each focusing on different study and
contributions.
• Chapter 2 presents the related work in the area of Social Computing, Computer
Science, and Political Science that informed the work in this thesis. This related
work covers the topic of censorship theories, Internet censorship, social media
use under repressive governments, and censorship circumvention.
• Chapter 3 presents a mixed-method study including interviews with Chinese
social media users and analysis of the profiles of 1.6 million Sina Weibo users to
identify the user-level effects of censorship on Chinese social media. This chapter
covers the methods used in the study, reports study results, and discusses the
results along with design implications based on the study’s results.
• Chapter 4 presents the Chinese homophone generation algorithm that I de-
veloped and the pipeline of processes that utilizes this homophone generation
algorithm to help circumvent censorship on Chinese social media. In this chap-
ter, I also present two experiments I conducted to prove the effectiveness of the
censorship circumvention technique.
• Chapter 5 presents an extension of the work in Chapter 4, a real-time system
to circumvent censorship on Chinese social media, CENSE. Before detailing the
design and the development of the two system components, the back-end server
and the front-end client, I present the results of a formative interview study
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with Chinese social media users regarding their opinions towards censorship
circumvention tools. Finally, I present screenshots of a use case scenario of the
system designed to circumvent censorship on Sina Weibo.
Finally, I conclude this thesis with a discussion of future directions for the research





In this chapter, I present a survey of literature in four areas that have informed and
shaped my research: censorship theories, Internet censorship practices, social media
use in repressive regimes, and current censorship circumvention techniques.
2.1 Censorship Theories
Internet censorship stems from the control that states have over press and journalists
who produce “traditional” media: newspaper, magazines, TV news. Once the In-
ternet gains popularity, states still want to maintain the control of information their
citizens receive. However, information on the Internet is harder to control than those
on other types of media because national borders are more permeable online; Internet
users can easily grab information published in other countries [66]. There are several
reasons why states are motivated to control information available to their citizens
and, consequently, impose Internet censorship [27, 80, 113, 118]:
• political repression of dissidents, human rights activists, or comments insulting
to the states (e.g. China, Iran, Myanmar)
• religious controls (e.g. Arab states)
• protection of intellectual properties (e.g. Denmark, France, Malaysia, Norway)
• cultural restrictions to oppress ethic and sexual minorities (e.g. Indonesia)
In practice, censorship involves control over Internet access, functionality, and
contents [30]. Internet censorship consists of three mechanisms: social, political, and
technical. Social mechanism put pressure on Internet users not to visit forbidden
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sites. However, globalization of information and the ease of connectivity exert a
counteracting social pressure in favor for free information. When social mechanism
fails, political mechanism applies. Internet users, especially political dissidents who
are some of the early users of circumvention technology, are often aware of the threats
from political force who are ready to enforce the laws. Technical mechanism acts as
both the first and last line of defense against access to undesirable information. In
the first place, lawmakers, through technical mechanism, can enable social mechanism
by designating which pieces of information citizens should avoid. As the last place,
technical mechanism can be triggered by actually blocking when social and political
mechanisms fail [126].
As a result, censorship is seen in two forms: direct censorship and self-censorship [85].
Direct censorship involves political and technical mechanisms that the government im-
poses to explicitly control the information available to their citizens. On the other
hand, self-censorship is influenced by social mechanism of censorship to discourage
publication of information by private parties. There are several techniques that gov-
ernments use to restrict and control Internet access, for example [113]:
• harassment of bloggers/whistle-blowers (social)
• tapping and surveillance (social)
• requiring discriminatory ISP licenses (political)
• discriminatory or prohibitive pricing policies (political)
• content filtering based on keywords (technical)
• website blocking of specific IP addresses (technical)
• hardware and software manipulation (technical)
• denial-of-service (DOS) attacks (technical)
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Because the original design of the Internet as a distributed system lets the In-
ternet tolerates damages from a single point of failure [66], precise filtering is almost
impossible [113]. Thus, states could suffer the risk of overblocking (blocking sites that
are not supposed to be censored) [27, 87] and underblocking (allowing sites that are
prohibited) [74].
More than 60 countries around the world control their local Internet—some with
more restrictions than others [78]. Researchers have been attempting to document
censorship practices in specific countries such as Pakistan [75], Iran [5], and China [19,
23, 60, 61]. However, with plethora of practices and techniques each country uses, the
task of documenting censorship practices seem to be neverending. While my research
does not contribute new knowledge to this area, previous works in censorship theories
provide context and shape the methods I use to answer my research questions. In the
next few sections, I will show some examples of how different countries around the
world control the information on their Internet and the consequences of these policies.
2.2 Internet Censorship
In this section, I review previous works which explore censorship practices around
the world. The section is divided into two subsections; the latter focuses solely on
works on Chinese Internet censorship since they provide context behind the work of
this thesis.
2.2.1 Internet censorship practices around the world
Nearly every country in the world controls the Internet access to their citizens one
way or the other [113]. Countries where citizens have more freedom and liberty such
as the United States and Australia use more reactive methods such as passing laws to
govern the Internet as a way to control information [100]. Other states filter Internet
data as it travels onto their local networks. Some countries are more transparent
with censorship than others. For example, Saudi Arabian Internet users are notified
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when they visit a block page. Internet users can also send requests to block or
unblock specific pages [13]. Some states even put the pressure on overseas firms
to block access to their own citizens. Twitter routinely releases removal requests
from several countries, revealing that the company has received the most removal
requests from the Turkish courts [108]. In countries with less transparency with their
censorship, researchers and activists have conducted studies, tests, and measurements
in an attempt to get a better understanding of the censorship mechanism of each
country.
Aryan et al. [5] investigated Internet censorship by setting up a testbed in Iran to
perform network measurements. They found Adult websites were the most blocked,
and almost half of the top 500 websites of the Internet were also blocked in Iran.
Political activists and bloggers in Southeast Asia have been struggling with their
freedom of speech. Vietnam imprisoned more than 46 bloggers and activists in the
first half of 2013. Singapore’s new rules governing online news led 150 Singaporean
websites to blackout in protest in 2012. Thailand banned more than 20,000 URLs in
2012, causing a chilling effect on freedom of expression throughout the country [17].
Myanmar’s military-led regime even limited communications by preventing access to
the Internet and prohibited the use of communication technology equipment such as
fax machines and satellite dishes [55].
Cubans have long been struggled with tightly controlled information for more
than 50 years [29]. While Cubans have Internet access, it comes in the forms of
email and local intranet where the only content available is the one hosted in Cuba.
Moreover, Internet access is extremely expensive for Cubans [55]. Thus, email access
is more common than Internet access because of the limited available content on the
Internet [29, 55]. Shklovski and Kotamraju found similar results in an anonymized
country where they conducted an interview study. Participants found blocking and
censorship to be confusing and inspiring self-censorship. Participants also blamed
13
the lack of content on the nation’s Internet and a threat to personal security on
censorship. In the context of online contribution to sites that rely on user-generated
content, Internet censorship creates conflicting goals between encouraging Internet
users in the country to generate content and controlling certain types of speech on
the Internet [95].
In the United States, Internet censorship is not as prominent, thanks to the free
speech provision of the First Amendment of the US constitution which prohibits fed-
eral, state, and local governments from directly censoring the Internet with exceptions
for obscenity, and especially child pornography. As a result, self-censorship by site
operators is more common. Some institutions and web sites employ censorship in
the form of content moderation to prevent controversy and inappropriate materials
emerging from user-generated content. For example, several popular social media
sites such as Facebook [33], Twitter [109], and Instagram [51] have explicitly (in their
terms of service) reserved the right to remove inappropriate content. Nevertheless,
these US-based social media companies still have to comply with government regula-
tions in other markets they serve to ensure that the content served on their sites are
deemed appropriate by other governments [61, 108].
2.2.2 Internet censorship practices in China
When the Internet was first introduced in China in 1990s, international observers
suggested that the Internet technology would pose a threat to China’s authoritarian
regime [55]. The Chinese government has carefully controlled the Internet develop-
ment in the country and developed one of the most notorious and the most technolog-
ically advanced [126] mechanism of Internet censorship: the Great Firewall of China
(GFC). Because only a limited number of companies are licensed by the government
to provide international network access to regional ISPs [13], the Chinese govern-
ment can easily regulate international Internet traffic through GFC. GFC is known
14
for its strict and dynamic censorship patterns where all traffics going in and out of
the country are inspected. Requests that match blocked keywords are restricted by
the routers that regulate the country’s Internet traffic [19]. In addition to specific
keywords, popular social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter are also blocked
in China [116]. However, the Chinese replicas of social network sites including Renren
(a replica of Facebook) and Sina Weibo (a replica of Twitter) are allowed in China,
albeit heavy content monitoring and censorship [60].
As more Chinese citizens become educated in the use of the Internet, they are more
aware of foreign products, cultures, and norms. Internet users turn to social media
to criticize the government and callout wrongdoings by governments and military
officials [119], launching a “blog revolution” [31, 84] which thriving the Internet with
creative usages of political satires, codewords, visual files, and implicit criticism [40,
47, 67, 69, 122, 125]. The revolution has turned the Internet into the platform for
political debate.
The Chinese government thus felt the need to impose tighter censorship and
put more responsibility of censorship on service providers [55, 100]. In physical
space, Internet cafe owners are responsible for monitoring their patrons’ digital activi-
ties [100, 121]. In digital space, chat room administrators need to hire censors or “Big
Mamas” to screen and remove offensive materials from online bulletin boards [103].
With the rise of popularity of social networking sites, site operators still follow the
same principles as in the early days of the Internet. On Sina Weibo, a Chinese mi-
croblogging service and one of the largest Chinese social media, there exists a set
of terms that led to a higher rate of post deletion. Moreover, posts from conflicting
regions were also deleted at a higher rate than those from other regions in China [8].
King et al. added that posts that promote collective actions—regardless of their pro-
or anti-government point of view—are mainly censored [60].
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Taking a step further, the Chinese government has recently “partnered” with tech-
nology companies such as China Mobile (a telecommunication provider,) Alibaba (an
e-commerce site,) Tencent (an instant messaging service,) and Qihoo 360 (a security
company providing anti-virus software, web browser, and mobile application store) to
station police officers at these companies. While the companies claim that the police
officers are there to “combat illegal and criminal activities on the Internet,” many
believe that this is a political censorship move by the government [24]. So far, the
government has arrested more than 15,000 for “crimes that jeopardized [the Inter-
net] security” [104]. On a positive note, a majority (> 95%) of participants from a
recent survey of Chinese Internet users were aware the existence of Chinese Internet
censorship [112].
With the aim to fully explore the censorship apparatus behind Chinese social
media, King and colleagues reverse-engineered the mechanics of censorship on Sina
Weibo [61]. To do this, they set up a new social media company in China in order to
gain access to customer service agents who would supply details about Chinese social
media censorship. In addition to automated review through keyword matching, they
found that a massive number of human censors also take part in the process. Figure 2
is a reproduction of their major result, representing a decision tree of censorship on
Chinese social media.
Figure 2 explains how the automated censorship mechanism and human censors
work together to filter inappropriate content on Chinese social media. Once a user
submits a post to Chinese social media, the automated censorship mechanism detects
whether the post contains any inappropriateness. If the automated mechanism clears
the post, the post gets publishes to the site. However, human censors can still reeval-
uate the post at a later time, within 24 hours, and remove the post from the site if
necessary. If the automated mechanism flags the post, human censors will manually
review the post and decide to allow the post to be published or to delete to post.
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Figure 2: Chinese censorship decision tree, reproduced from King et al. [61].
If a user repeats posting inappropriate content, the account can get banned by the
automated mechanism.
In my research, I plan to extend the current understandings of censorship prac-
tices and their consequences, especially in the context of Chinese social media. While
previous research has extensively explored the mechanisms behind censorship on Chi-
nese Internet and social media, little work has been done to explore the users’ side of
this equation. In this thesis, I conduct research to understand the effects censorship
has on Chinese social media users, using both quantitative and qualitative methods
in order to explore the breath and depth of this issue.
2.3 Social Media Use under Repressive Regimes
Social networking sites (SNS) bootstrap from real-world social connections and al-
low users to expand connections beyond their real-world friends, families, and ac-
quaintances [11]. Researchers have been arguing that recreational use of media,
whether traditional media such as televisions [81, 82] or modern media such as In-
ternet [64, 92, 93], have disengaged people from participating in political and civic
activities. However, a contrasting example was shown that exposure and attention to
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public affairs television program can enhance political participation [72, 73, 77].
While social network sites provide opportunities to connect with people all over
the worlds, their users do not use these sites to make new connections, but rather
bonding existing ones [11, 65]. Social interactions on SNS can increase social capital
even though the tie between the two persons is only a weak tie [14]. While the
online interactions on SNS seem virtual and insubstantial, close friends and strong
ties are still much more influential than weak ties [10]. However, only bridging social
connections—connecting heterogeneous groups of people—will bring about social and
political change [83]. Before 2008, there were no substantial evidence that show social
media’s influence on political activities [123]. However, the 2008 Obama Presidential
Campaign has shown how social networking sites can play a critical role in social
mobilization for political goals [20, 21, 90, 119].
Under repressive regimes, social networking sites are more than just places where
people go to make connections. Because traditional media outlets usually get moni-
tored and censored by governing units and journalists frequently practice self-censorship
[99], political activists and citizen journalists turn to social media to broadcast their
messages and report events in their local areas. Social media provides new sources of
information the regimes cannot easily control [107] because censorship and blocking of
the Internet can cause uproar against the governing units from not only political ac-
tivists but also average citizens. The examples in Egypt and Tunisia have shown that
technology can help overthrew repressive governments without the need of organized
leaders [46].
The most notable case which social media played a big role in overthrowing re-
pressive regimes was the 2011 Egyptian revolution. Egyptian dissidents and activists
used social media platforms such as email, blogs, and social networking sites to cre-
ate uproar and arrange protests against the regime of, then, President Mubarak. The
organization of protests on social media was successful in gathering people in Tahir
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Square, causing the government to shut down the Internet just after midnight on
January 28, 2011. However, the shut down came too late and that morning, there
were people at Tahir Square more than ever [28]. Al-Ani et al. conducted an analysis
on Egyptian blogs and the roles they play in the 2011 Egyptian revolution [4]. Topic
modeling analysis on the corpus showed a strong inverse relationship between the
occurrence of personal/self-oriented posts and political posts. Overtime, Egyptian
blogs became increasingly political. In addition to providing commentary regarding
political situations, many blog posts reported updates on events occurring in Egypt
during the Arab Spring. Several aspects of the uprising such as police presence and
government reactions were included in the reports.
The use of social media in Egypt leading to the revolution and overthrown of
Mubarak’s regime was influential to other countries. For example, people in Tunisia,
using a similar model of communications through social media, arranged a demon-
stration in Tunis with a nationwide call for participation mainly via Facebook [120].
The uproar in Tunisia started when the government blocked access to Dailymotion, a
popular video sharing site among French-speaking countries, when activists posted a
video unfolding how the president abused the use of the Tunisian presidential aircraft
for private trips. Tunisian citizens, who might not be politically active, were made
aware of the government’s concern of free speech from this censorship [125].
The use of social media to arrange political protests can be traced back for more
than a decade, predating the popularization of social networking sites such as Face-
book and Twitter. One of the early protests organized with the aid of communication
technology was in 2001 when citizens in Manila arranged a protest via text messages,
resulting in a mass of a million people in downtown Manila [94]. Over the past
decade, there were many instances where social media has played an important role
in successful uprisings of citizens against dictatorship and repressive governments
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such as Egypt [4, 28] and Tunisia [120]. Moreover, these uprisings also created rip-
ple effects to other repressive governments who are trying to adapt to the evolution
of technology to prohibit technology-led political movements [46, 94]. For example,
the Chinese government blocked the search term “Egypt”, fearing that the Egyp-
tian protest would inspire unrest in China [7]. Research suggests that the use of
social networking tools increases interpersonal discussion that fosters civic participa-
tion and political activism [7, 123], contrasting the early theories developed by social
scientists [64, 81, 82, 92, 93].
These phenomenons played a part in inspiring the development of the “Cute Cat
Theory of Digital Activism” [115, 125]. The theory posits that most people only use
the Internet for mundane activities such as searching for pornography and images of
cats. Tools such as Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, are developed for people to share this
kind of contents with each other. These platforms are also useful to social movement
and political activists who choose not to develop dedicated tools themselves. In turn,
activists are more immune to government blocking and censorship because shutting
down popular websites would provoke a larger public uproar than shutting down
dedicated platforms for activism [115].
However, using social media does not always guarantee a successful demolition of
repressive regimes. There were several cases that the activists’ uprisings organized
through social media have failed. For example, street protests in Belarus in March
2006 organized via email leaving the president “more determined than ever to control
social media.” The June 2009 uprising of Green Movement in Iran where activists
exerted technological tools to organize the protest and the 2010 Red Shirt uprising
in Thailand where social media savvy occupied downtown Bangkok both resulted in
violence crackdowns [94]. HCI researchers started to focus on using technology to
promote peace and reduce conflicts that could lead to war. The impact of war not
only affects the countries’ economic status [101] but also incurs costs in terms of
20
valuable human lives [45].
Using social media to organize gathering of citizens and political activists have
surprised many researchers and journalists by the fact that the Internet can generate
such strong commitments from its users. Of course, social media by itself cannot cause
changes and revolutions. However, social media “combined with the right economic,
social and political forces can be a potent threat to any leader, anywhere” [96]. Social
media helps form social capital among people with the same struggle and same vision
to create a bigger group to fight against repressive regimes. Wellman et al. raised
a question how the Internet impacts social capital in real-world communities [114].
Increasing social capital, the Internet provides new and better ways of communication
and meeting spaces for people with common interests, ridding of the limitation of
space and time. On the other hand, the Internet could remove users from their
immediate physical environment, and thus, reducing the social capital in the real
world. In mediation, the Internet may be better at bonding existing social connections
than creating new ones [63]. Thus, it is hard to generate organizational and political
participation if users have no existing interests in the matters [114]. However, social
media can function as the first step of engagement, along the line with the foot-in-
the-door strategy which is a phenomenon when a person is more likely to fulfill a
large request when he/she already agreed to a more modest request [37, 57].
Social media use has become essential in everyday lives of Chinese Internet users.
However, there is a gap in research between the practice of censorship and user
behavior in the context of Chinese social media. Little research has explored how
censorship causes changes in the usage behavior of Chinese social media users. As a
part of this thesis, I analyze usage logs of social media users who have been censored




There are two dimensions of anti-censorship tools: free access to information and free
publication of information [66]. In this section, I review related work that documents
and develops tools to approach each of these dimensions.
2.4.1 Free access to information
There are several strategies that people living in the countries with Internet censorship
employ to get around censorship and retrieve information censored in their countries.
Internet users with moderate to advanced technical skills rely on services such as
VPN, proxy, and anonymizer to get access to blocked content and keep themselves
anonymous in the case that their generated content cause any troubles [5, 95]. Services
such as VPN Gate [110] provide access to VPN servers worldwide free of charge,
allowing citizens of countries under censorship to access VPN services at little to no
cost. Some Internet users utilize their social connections outside of their countries to
gain access to blocked sites and to get around speed throttling [29, 95, 120].
VPN and proxies are proved to be potent in providing access to information cen-
sored. Thus, researchers have devoted efforts to create tools to measure censorship
from single or several vantage points [16, 36, 49, 54, 78, 91]. When the Internet ser-
vices are not available, wireless mesh network [1, 2] supports hyper-local networks
where users can create their own networks. While the range of wireless mesh network
does not span as large of an area as the Internet does, several situations have proven
that this technology can be useful when the Internet services are congested [3], un-
available [53, 56], or inappropriate for the scope of communication [58, 71]. Cities
in Greece and Spain have shown that wireless mesh network can span the area of a
city with thousands of nodes in the network, threatening internet service providers
to provide better services [6, 28, 41, 62, 105].
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2.4.2 Free publication of information
With the Web 2.0, users become content generator rather than just content con-
sumers [119]. However, not all regimes allow their citizens to speak freely on the In-
ternet. I have already shown in previous sections that Chinese social media companies
are required to hire human censors to filter content on their sites [61, 103]. Chinese
social media is already filled with word plays, morphs, and homophones to circum-
vent censorship [18, 47, 122, 125]. Social media users often practice self-censorship to
minimize the possibility of getting blocked [95].
Numerous researchers have worked on techniques and tools with the aim to cir-
cumvent censorship on the Internet. Similar to Chinese word plays, users can translate
a message in to another language and back to the original language [86] or omit cer-
tain parts of a message [39] to create confusions to censors and become immune to
surveillance. Researchers have also developed tools to encode hidden messages into
regular, innocuous media [15, 35]. However, the pitfalls of these tools are (1) receivers
might not share the same knowledge as senders to recover missing information or (2)
messages need to be decoded using technologically advanced tools. Moreover, these
tools are appropriate for only private communications, rendering useless when users
wish to publicly broadcast messages.
Because Chinese users already have access to information on Chinese social media
and access to foreign information can be obtained through VPN, the free access of
information is not in the scope of this thesis. To achieve the goal of free publication
of information, I extend current knowledge about the mechanism behind censorship
on Chinese social media and develop a system that helps Chinese social media users
publish messages that are costly to censor.
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CHAPTER III
USER-LEVEL EFFECTS OF CENSORSHIP ON CHINESE
SOCIAL MEDIA
“The Chinese government just released a new law. If you post something
[on Chinese social media] that’s not true but it has been shared for 500
times, you will be responsible for that. What action they will take I don’t
know. Maybe they will be fined 5,000 yuan.” — P6, illustrating the
extent to which China can control the Internet within its borders.
China has arguably the world’s most advanced Internet filtering system—the
Great Firewall of China. It not only blocks specific sites, but also inspects every
packet of Internet traffic to filter banned keywords [19]. Since people cannot access
sites like Facebook and Twitter, Chinese social media services such as Sina Weibo
and WeChat have flourished over the past decade [8]. However, unlike their Western
counterparts, the operators of sites like Sina Weibo are required by the government
to heavily censor inappropriate content using both advanced algorithms and human
censors [61, 103]. From the state’s point of view, this setup is ideal, as it allows
the citizenry to have access to modern communication technologies as well as let off
steam about governmental injustice [42], yet those technologies live under the control
and surveillance of central authorities [70]. Previous research has explored the mech-
anisms behind the censorship [8, 61] as well as techniques that Chinese social media
users employ to circumvent it [18, 47, 122, 125]. However, little is known about the
effects censorship has on actual users of these censored systems.
This chapter presents a mixed-methods study focusing on user-level effects of
censorship on Chinese social media. Borrowing from distributed cognition [48], the
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effects were categorized into two types: off-platform effects and on-platform effects.
Off-platform effects live inside users’ minds and habits (i.e., self-censorship practices,
risks associated with posting censored content) and are not directly observable in a
user’s social media usage log. On-platform effects are the opposite: they show in
a user’s trail of social media usage (i.e., effects on subsequent speech and account
abandonment following the enactment of censorship).
The mixed-methods study involves two parts: a quantitative data analysis and
an interview study. I gathered the data of more than 1.6 million Sina Weibo users,
one of the largest Chinese social media sites—8,140 of whom were the subjects of
government censorship. Using a propensity score matching design, I examine the on-
platform effects of censorship by comparing censored users and a constructed control
group. I also interviewed 11 Chinese social media users to learn the habits and
behaviors users have adopted in response to widespread censorship.
A strong off-platform effect of censorship on Chinese social media was detected.
Users heavily self-censor around political topics because of uncertain, perceived risks
of censorship, echoing the findings from earlier work [95]. The matched-sample analy-
sis illustrated on-platform effects: censored users reduced their posting activity 3.91%
more than the control group in the 30-day period following censorship. That is, the
enactment of censorship leads to a short-term suppression of speech. Moreover, 3.55%
of censored users presumably abandoned their accounts in the same period, a small in-
crease over the 1.33% of the control group. While the on-platform effects are present,
they diminish over time, and eventually, as indicated by [112], users do not perceive
the effects of censorship in their daily social media routines.
For those opposed to state-mandated censorship of social media, these results are
discouraging. While both off-platform and on-platform effects certainly exist, the on-
platform effects are relatively small and the off-platform effects are largely confined to
controversial topics. In other words, it seems to us that the state is getting precisely
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what it wants from its censorship apparatus: people think twice about posting about
political topics, and state controlled social media platforms like Sina Weibo do not
pay a steep price in user participation when it actually deploys censorship. This is
crucial to their place as a “safety valve.” Looking beyond China, it therefore seems
difficult to argue—in terms of participation costs—that other authoritarian regimes
(e.g, Russia, Iran, etc.) should not simply copy the Chinese model.
3.1 Research Questions
As outlined in the previous chapter the extent that the Chinese government has
controlled their Internet, Internet users in China face with not only rigorous website
and keyword filtering but also extensive machine and human censors on social media
sites hosted in China. Ongoing work has attempted to document censorship practices
in China [19, 23, 60, 61, 112]. However, most of them are conducted do not involve
Chinese Internet users. Therefore, there is a gap in the exploration of the behaviors of
Chinese Internet and social media users in the face of widespread censorship, leading
to my first research question:
RQ1. How are Chinese social media users affected by censorship
off platform?
To get into more details, the literature suggested that censorship is heavily corre-
lated to the content of posts, I want to further explore users’ perception of censored
content: [60, 122, 124].
RQ1.1. What content do Chinese social media users perceive to
be censorship-prone?
Moreover, Western media have reported several cases where activities on Chinese
social media have led to prosecutions or disappearances of social media users. I want
to assess the risks perceived by Chinese social media users: [9, 76, 79].
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RQ1.2. What are Chinese social media users’ perceived online
and real-life risks of censorship?
Previous research has shown that Chinese citizens have mixed opinions on cen-
sorship [112]. Although [95] has shown self-reported data that censorship discourages
contribution to sites with user-generated content, Chinese social media still adds users
year after year. In 2015, an estimated 481M people (35.4% of the total Chinese pop-
ulation) reportedly visited social media at least once a month [50]. This mismatch
leads to the next research question:
RQ2. What are the on-platform effects censorship has on Chi-
nese social media users?
One of the key metrics for engagement on social media is user participation. As
demonstrated by [95], although social media sites can be up and running, users may
neglect the platform due to censorship.
RQ2.1. How does an act of censorship affect subsequent user
participation?
Even though GFC blocks access to Western social media such as Facebook and
Twitter, an increasing number of of Chinese Internet users (166M in 2014, 188M in
2015 [97, 98]) were reported to have access to VPNs and thus, have access to more
selection of social media, including restricted ones. This leads to the next part of the
research question:
RQ2.2. How does censorship influence user abandonment of
Chinese social media accounts?
To summarize, I ask two main research questions in this chapter. First, what are
the off-platform effects of censorship that are not observable from usage logs. Second,
what are the on-platform effects of censorship that are visible from usage logs.
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1. How are Chinese social media users affected by censorship off platform?
2. What are the on-platform effects censorship has on Chinese social media users?
3.2 Methods
I categorize the user-level effects of censorship on Chinese social media using the
language borrowed from Distributed Cognition, a framework that describes how cog-
nition is distributed across users, objects, artifacts, and tools in an environment [48].
Thus, I explore the research questions in two ways: off-platform and on-platform ef-
fects. I seek to understand both the effects of censorship on users’ mental models and
habits (off-platform), as well as their actual practices in response to the enactment
of censorship on-site (on-platform).
In this chapter, I am interested in exploring perception of censored content (RQ1.1)
and perceived risks of getting censored (RQ1.2), both of which are off-platform effects
and do not usually translate to observable signals on Chinese social media. Therefore,
I choose to conduct an interview study to answer these research questions. I also take
a close look at on-platform effects. On-platform effects are observable via data from
Chinese social media platforms—such as user activity levels, the content of posts, etc.
In this chapter, I explore participation (RQ2.1) and account abandonment (RQ2.2).
In this section, I detail the methods of the mixed-methods study—both the inter-
view study and the quantitative data analysis. I start with the details of the interview
study. Then, I describe the datasets behind the quantitative analysis. Finally, I lay
out the statistical analysis of the datasets to answer my research questions.
3.2.1 Interview Study
Due to the sensitivity of the topic of Internet censorship and to ensure that partici-
pants are familiar with Chinese social media and culture, I carefully selected partici-
pants based on a number of criteria:
28
1. To ensure that participants are familiar with culture, politics, and the Internet
in China, participants must be Chinese citizens who have lived in China for at
least two years.
2. To mitigate risks and protect participant identity and security, participants
must be in the US at the time of the interview, so the interviews can be con-
ducted either in person or over domestic US phone calls. Because I do not know
the surveillance capabilities of the Chinese government inside China, I err on
the caution to remove the risks that the interview sessions could be under the
surveillance of the Chinese government.
3. To ensure that participants are familiar with Chinese social media, participants
must be users of Chinese social media.
While this induces a bias in the selection of participants, I believe that these
requirements are justified given the sensitivity of the topic and the risks associated
with the study. I did not opt for Internet-based channels (e.g., Skype calls or a
survey) because of these risks. To make sure that participants’ identities are fully
protected, I requested that Georgia Tech Institutional Review Board (IRB) waive
documentation of consent. That is, the participants did not have to sign a consent
form, leaving no record of their identities. Moreover, I also requested to forego the
collection of participants’ information for the purpose of compensation. Therefore,
no personally identifiable information was kept. Other identifying information about
the participants, such as age, gender, location, years living in the US, social media
handle, etc., were also not collected.
I recruited participants through several of Georgia Tech mailing lists, personal
contacts, and snowballing from recruited participants. In the end, I enrolled 11
participants in the interview study. During the interviews, participants were asked
about their general use of Chinese social media: what sites/applications they use,
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the purposes for which they use Chinese social media, etc. Then, they were asked
questions to answer all of the research questions: user perception of censorship and
responses to censorship on Chinese social media.
Interviews were semi-structured and conducted in English. The interview ques-
tions are presented below. While the participants’ first language was not English,
they were fluent in English. The interview lasted 20-45 minutes, with an average
of 33 minutes. Participants were compensated with $15 retail gift cards for their
time. The interview sessions were audio recorded, with the consent of participants,
and transcribed. Then, I conducted thematic analysis [12] and performed qualitative
coding based on the research questions I have established.
3.2.1.1 Interview Questions
Background Questions
1. What are the Chinese social media sites that you use?
(a) What kinds of users do you follow?
(b) What kinds of content do you post on social media?
2. Comparing Chinese social media and Western social media (Facebook, Twitter)
how do you use them differently?
(a) How often do you visit each of the sites? Tell us why your usage between
Chinese and Western social media are different.
(b) How are your posts on Chinese and Western social media different, in terms
of content and the number of posts?
(c) Why do you use Chinese and Western social media differently?
Acknowledgment of censorship
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3. How did you come to know of the existence of censorship on Chinese social
media?
4. Do you think Western social media (Facebook, Twitter) observe similar censor-
ship? What made you think so?
5. Tell us about your experience of getting censored.
(a) If so, how did you know that you have been censored?
(b) What were the contents of the posts that were censored?
(c) How did you feel when you were censored?
(d) What did you do after you learned that your posts got censored?
6. Tell us about your experience of noticing other people’s posts getting censored.
(a) How did you come to notice them?
(b) What were the contents?
(c) How did you feel when you saw other people’s posts get censored? How
did it impact your use of social media?
7. In your opinion, what types of posts generally get censored? Why do you think
so?
Effects of Censorship
8. How does censorship make you feel?
9. If censorship on Chinese social media did not exist, how would you use the sites
differently?
(a) Would you post more to the sites?
(b) Would you spend more time on the sites?
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10. Tell me about posts that you withheld from posting because of censorship
(a) What was the content?
(b) Who was your target audience?
(c) What did you end up doing with that post(s)? Did you publish it/them
elsewhere? Where else did you publish it/them?
11. If you use both Chinese and Western social media, how do you use them differ-
ently?
(a) Who are your friends/connections on each site? How are they differ?
(b) What content do you post to each site? How do they differ?
12. Have you ever thought of leaving Chinese social media due to censorship? Why
or why not?
13. If Western social media are readily available in China, will you leave the Chinese
sites? Why or why not?
Perceived risks of censorship
14. What do you think could happen to your social media account if you post
something that gets censored?
15. Have you ever noticed something different with people you follow when they
get censored? What was it?
16. What do you think are the risks of posting censored-sensitive posts on Chinese
social media?
17. Tell us what do you think could happen if you keep posting posts that get
censored?
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(a) Why do you think so?
(b) Where/Who could these consequences be from?
18. What are the measures that you practice to stay safe on social media?
3.2.2 Sina Weibo Datasets
In parallel, I collected large-scale data from Sina Weibo, one of the largest Chinese
social media platforms, with more than 200 million monthly active users [111]. Sina
Weibo is a microblog service where users can post a short 140-character status update
to their timeline, essentially the Chinese equivalent of Twitter. Because of its large
user base, Sina Weibo has amassed a variety of users and content, ranging from daily
updates from everyday people to political comments from journalists and activists.
I collected two datasets. First, censored posts were collected from Weiboscope [124],
a site that curates Sina Weibo posts from popular accounts and also periodically
checks whether these posts have been censored. I collected 42,638 posts that were
censored from January 1, 2014 to October 3, 2015. These posts were authored by
9,860 different Sina Weibo users. However, as of January 1, 2016, 1,720 user accounts
from this group were completely deleted. I discarded these users from our dataset
because I cannot obtain their account information and the reasons these accounts
were deleted: voluntarily or banned. Thus, 8,140 users were left in the first dataset.
For each of these users, I collected their basic profile information as of January
1, 2016, including gender, the number of followers, the number of posts, the date
of the first post, and location. Moreover, I also collected recent posts from each of
these users’ timeline as of January 1, 2016. These users were assigned to be in the
treatment group, as they had each been censored in the past.
The second dataset is the induced control group. I monitored the Sina Weibo pub-
lic timeline and collected information including the number of followers, the number of
posts, the date of the first post, and location from more than 1.6 million users. After
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Table 1: Summary of the dataset. The leftmost column shows descriptive statistics
of the control group before matching. The two rightmost columns (in green) show
descriptive statistics of the matched control group and the treatment group, both of
which I use in the quantitative analysis.
Control Matched Control Treatment
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Attributes
number of followers 4,914 172,075 379,355 2,073,549 477,626 3,148,631
number of accounts follow 445 619 802 831 959 859
number of posts 3,393 5,567 16,024 31,526 17,896 40,519
account age (days) 1,187 525 1,489 539 1,494 551
number of censored posts 4.31 10.89
N 1,665,487 8,140 8,140
Matching Covariates
log(number of followers) 5.30 1.58 10.01 2.58 10.02 2.61
log(number of posts) 7.20 1.51 8.47 1.88 8.46 1.97
log(account age) 6.90 0.77 7.20 0.53 7.20 0.54
gender male 748,931 5,676 5,676
female 916,556 2,464 2,464
Mahalanobis distance matching with the treatment group (details below) the control
group was narrowed down to 8,140 users, and these users’ recent posts as of January
1, 2016 were collected the same way as the users in the treatment group. Table 1
summarizes descriptive statistics of the treatment group and the control group.
3.2.2.1 Mahalanobis Distance Matching
In order to account for the fact that user accounts in our treatment group may not
conform to the general demographics of Sina Weibo and general social media users,
I need to construct a subset of the control group which most resemble the treatment
group [89]. I performed Mahalanobis Distance Matching (MDM) by using the R
MatchIt package [44]. MDM is similar to Propensity Score Matching (PSM) as both
of them are statistical techniques for data preprocessing, suitable in the case of causal
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Table 2: Statistic tests of the matching covariates and their corresponding raw values
between the matched control and treatment groups.
Matched Groups
StatisticsControl Treatment
mean sd mean sd
Student t-test
Matching Covariates t p
log number of followers 10.01 2.58 10.02 2.61 -0.34 0.74
log number of posts 8.47 1.88 8.46 1.97 0.24 0.81
log account age 7.20 0.53 7.20 0.54 0.1 0.92
Mann-Whitney Test
Attributes U p
number of followers 379,355 2,073,549 477,626 3,148,631 33065000 0.82
number of posts 16,024 31,526 17,896 40,519 33057000 0.81
account age (days) 1,489 539 1,494 551 32857000 0.36
N 8,140 8,140
inference where the treatment group is exposed to the treatment condition, but no
systematic methods are available to obtain a control group [26]. However, MDM
calculates euclidean distance between samples, while PSM assigns a score to each
sample based on the logistic regression model of the control samples. Thus, MDM
matching better utilizes the information of the matching variables and their relative
importance [59]. In my experiments, MDM provides better matching between my
treatment and control groups, resulting in similar matched control samples to my
treatment samples.
My matching paired treatment and control users that were similar in four ob-
servable characteristics: the log-scale number of followers, the log-scale number of
posts, the log-scale of account age, and gender. The reason I chose to use log-scale of
continuous variables (number of followers, number of posts, and account age) rather
than the raw values was because the range of these values in the dataset is extremely
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wide. It is a common method to employ in social media analysis. I used the nearest
neighbor method with a 1:1 ratio: the algorithm matched one treatment user with the
most similar control user, one at a time, until all the treatment users were matched
with the same number of control users [44].
After performing propensity score matching, 8,140 users from the control group
were matched with 8,140 users from the treatment group. Table 2 summarizes the
statistical tests to compare the matching covariates and their corresponding attributes
in raw scale (rather than log scale) between the matched control and treatment groups.
I compared the three continuous matching covariates (log number of followers, log
number of posts, and log account age) using Student t-test. The assumptions of the
t-test are met in this case:
1. The sample sizes are sufficiently large (N = 8, 140 in both groups).
2. Figure 3 shows that all three attributes normal distribution.
3. Homogeneity of variance is satisfied in the case of log number of followers and
log account age.
4. The test is adjusted for the unequal variances of log number of posts.
The raw-value attributes (number of followers, number of posts, days of account
age) are compared using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test as they all do not
meet the assumptions of Student t-test. We can see from the statistics tests that the
Mahalanobis matching did a good job matching the control group with the treatment
group as all the tests show no significant differences in all comparisons between the
two matched groups.
3.2.3 Post-censorship Participation & Abandonment Analysis
To observe the on-platform effects of censorship, I look at two metrics: posting ac-


























































































































































































































Figure 3: Q-Q Plots of three matching covariates between the control group and the
treatment group. (a) log number of followers, (b) log number of posts, (c) log days
of account age.
period before and after censorship occurred to explore the effects of censorship on user
participation (RQ2.1). To avoid an averaging effect in treatment users with multiple
censorship instances, I only included the latest censorship instance from each user in
the treatment group.
For each user in the control group, I randomly select one focus day from January
1, 2014 – October 3, 2015 (the days that users in the treatment group had their posts
censored) on which the user had at least one post. Then, I gathered the posting
activities from each of the users around each of their randomized focus dates. In
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other words, the focus date serves as an artificial censored date for the control group.
From hereon, I collectively call the dates of the latest censorship instances from the
treatment group and the randomly selected dates from the control group the focus
dates. As a result, each user in both the treatment group and the control group only
contributed one interval around their respective focus dates.
Then, I look at how the effects of censorship on posting activity propagates
through time. I varied the interval period of posting activity to 1, 3, 5, 7, 14, and 30
days before and after the focus dates of each user. Figure 4 shows examples of how
the posting activity were calculated for different intervals. For each of these intervals,
I compared the group total number of posts in the days before and after the focus
dates between the treatment and the control group. Using Mann-Whitney U test,
I test whether censorship in the treatment group has significant effects on posting
activity compared to the control group.
To answer RQ2.2 regarding user abandonment of Chinese social media account,
I define abandoned user accounts in the k-day interval as the accounts that have
posting activities in the k days before the focused dates, but not in the k days after
the focused dates, k ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 14, 30}. For example, if Jackie’s account has posts
on Day -6 and Day 17 in addition to the focus date (6 days before the focus date and
17 days after the focus date). Her account will be considered as abandoned in the
k ∈ {7, 14} interval because of the activity in the k days before the focused date, but
no activity in the k days after. For other values of k, her account is not considered
abandoned.
I observe how the abandonment of accounts in both the treatment group and
the control group changes over periods of time to conclude whether censorship has
an effect on account abandonment. Note that I use the term abandonment as a
presumption since I do not have the ground truth whether the users have returned





July 24 – August 7 
+30 Days -30 Days 
August 30 July 1 
+7 Days -7 Days 
August 7 July 24 
30-Day Interval 
July 1 – August 30 
Figure 4: An example timeline in the quantitative analysis. If a user’s focus date
is July 31, we will focus on the posting activity from July 1–August 30. The 7-day
interval will span from July 24–August 7 (7 days before and 7 days after the focus
date). The 30-day interval will span from July 1–August 30 (30 days before and 30
days after the focus date.)
3.3 Results
Next I report results from our mixed-methods study, categorized by off- and on-
platform effects. Before I present the results, I first contextualize Chinese social
media using quotes from our interview participants
3.3.1 Chinese Social Media Landscape
The most popular services used by my participants were WeChat and Sina Weibo.
WeChat is a messaging/social networking service where users can send messages to
friends in their contact lists (similar to Whatsapp and Facebook Messenger). In
addition to messaging, WeChat also has a “Moments” page where users can privately
share status updates to their friends and view activities shared by their friends or
public accounts they follow. Sina Weibo is a microblog service and has the same
functionality as Twitter. Users can publicly or privately post a short 140-character
microblog, or weibo. Regardless of the privacy option, most of Sina Weibo users post
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publicly, and all of the participants perceived Sina Weibo as a public platform. Some
participants even considered Sina Weibo to be “too public.”
Although Western social media such as Facebook and Twitter are blocked by
GFC [8], access to these services within China is possible via VPNs. Among my
participants, only P11 started using Facebook while he/she was in China. The rest of
the participants have heard of Western social media services while they were in China,
but they were not interested in signing up because of the lack of known contacts on
the platform. It was not until our participants came to the US that they started
signing up for Western social media accounts.
All but one of our participants still use Chinese social media while they are in
the US to keep contact with their friends and families in China, and to read up on
news, current events, and trends. P5 was the only participant who reported that
he/she no longer used Chinese social media because of his/her frustration with its
censorship policy. His/her family had all migrated to the US, leaving him/her with
no significant ties in China, and consequently, no reason to maintain Chinese social
media accounts.
3.3.1.1 Awareness of Censorship
In order for censorship on Chinese social media to have an effect on users, the users
need to be aware of censorship first. Previous research has shown that majority of
Chinese Internet users are aware of censorship on the Chinese Internet and social
media [112]. My results echo this finding. All but one participant (P4) reported
that they knew of the existence of censorship on Chinese social media. Most of the
participants knew about censorship from their friends or family members, while some
experienced censorship first hand—having either been censored themselves or seen
other users’ posts censored.
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Censorship is a common knowledge among Chinese Internet users. Some-
times if you talk about political stuff, because we are a communist country,
we also have some bad stuff happened in the history I think the government
still tries not to publicly talk about. (P2)
For those who encountered censorship first hand, they utilized several signals to
detect censorship, such as disappearance of posts, system messages, and complaints
from censored users.
[I posted something on Sina Weibo, and] within a few hours, this post was
retweeted over a thousand times, had over 300–400 comments, and then
it disappeared. Some people were asking me did I delete it; I said no. So
I went back to take a look. First, I found out on my post, the [button] to
retweet was gone. Secondly, it became invisible to outsider. . . Nobody can
find it, only I can see it. (P1)
One day I posted something that used the year 1989. It’s actually nothing
to do with any event but my article was deleted because of some sensitive
words in it and I was surprised and I tested it paragraph by paragraph then
I found out the sensitive word is the year. (P7)
He [whose post got censored] just posted status that the picture [he] just
uploaded got censored. (P9)
After the participants had experienced Western social media when they came to
the US, they noticed the differences in censorship policy between Chinese and Western
social media.
I feel like in America the censorship is not focused on politics. It still
exists. In America people focus more on terrorism than politics. (P2)
I’m sure Facebook has the same capability of monitoring as Chinese social
media but they don’t exercise that the way they do in China. (P5)
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3.3.2 RQ1. Off-platform Effects
Next, I present findings from our interview study addressing RQ1.1 and RQ1.2.
3.3.2.1 RQ1.1. Participants perceive political content as more censorship-prone.
The majority of participants believed that posts with content related to Chinese
politics, governmental policy, and “different opinions about [the government]” (P11)
were more likely to be censored than other content. However, none of the participants
were able to specify what specific topics related to politics are being censored on
Chinese social media. Participants vaguely claimed that the degree of “sensitivity”
of the content is the deciding factor, but they were not able to quantify it or give
concrete examples.
On a related note, P1, P6, and P9 referred to the recent crackdown of rumors
on Chinese social media. Chinese social media providers have installed a “rumor
clarification system” to automatically block rumors from spreading on the sites. At
the same time, the Chinese government has passed a law to criminalize social media
users whose posted rumors got more than 500 reposts [9].
The Chinese government just released a new law. If you post something
that’s not true but it has been shared for 500 times, you will be responsible
for that. What action they will take I don’t know. Maybe they will be fined
5,000 yuan. (P6)
Sina Weibo has a system called rumor clarification system. If someone
posts a piece of news that is not verified but later being verified fake, they
will be punished. (P9)
Mirroring the findings from [112], three of the participants endorsed censorship
on the platform. They felt that censorship on Chinese social media is an appropriate
measure to control a country with a large population.
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In China, we have so many people, and if someone says something stupid
there will be a lot of people who don’t know that’s not true. You can
spread out wrong information. It’s hard to rule the country that has so
many people, so they want to make sure that good stuff is online. (P2)
However, other participants felt that censorship had become less useful and more
irritating to Chinese Internet users—especially among young people.
I feel [censorship is] less and less useful in the new world. . . . Nowadays
many people know how to get around the blocking or censorship and people
just know more about the world than before. It’s less and less useful and
more and more agitating to people in China, especially young people. I
think I do too. I feel that it’s a restriction. (P7)
3.3.2.2 RQ1.2. Unclear online and real-life risks from censorship.
The participants valued the connections they had on social media. Therefore, they
needed to adapt their social media usage to keep their accounts from being banned.
Sina Weibo is a very good social media tool to convey my message . . . I
enjoy it. I love the interaction. So I’m very careful not to cross the red
line . . . I’m trying to post something and having a lot of fun interactions
but I also appreciate the social media outlet . . . I tried my best to stay
within the boundaries. (P1)
The first risk of posting sensitive content or false information on Chinese social
media that the participants observed was getting the post deleted. However, the
participants had conflicting reports regarding what could happen to their online ac-
counts. A few believed there are no consequences to posting sensitive content. Others
believed that posting sensitive content could lead to banning or temporary account
blocking.
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Beyond online punishment, the participants also had conflicting concepts of real-
life consequences or prosecutions from posting sensitive content. Due to a large
population, a few participants did not foresee being tracked down from their social
media profile.
However, the majority of the participants believed that getting censored on Chi-
nese social media could have real-life impact. Most participants agreed that if the
censored posts contain extremely sensitive content, then the government might take
action to prosecute the social media users. Nevertheless, none of the participants
knew for sure what kinds of sensitive content would trigger the prosecution and what
actions the government would take against users.
I’ve heard of police involvement with someone posting anything too ex-
treme. I’m not sure exactly what the police do with about it. They do take
it to another level. (P5)
They will be fined by the government. I think whatever you post, you have
to be responsible for that. (P6)
I’d say if you really bad rumors that have a bad social impact, you may
get arrested. (P9)
3.3.2.3 Off-platform Effects: Participants avoid creating original content to stay
safe.
Regardless of the participants’ mental models of censorship on Chinese social media
and their perceived risks of posting sensitive content on social media, all of the par-
ticipants were aware that they should be careful when posting content on Chinese
social media. Even though some participants did not foresee any risks associated with
posting sensitive content on Chinese social media, they still stayed away from posting
sensitive content because they did not want to get involved in heated discussions on
social media. In other words, the participants’ awareness of censorship influenced
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them to self-censor.
I would probably withhold anything political, anything opinionated towards
the government. When the Shanghai expo was happening, I think I men-
tioned something like it was not that important of an event and I thought
twice about posting that so I didn’t. I couldn’t access the VPN so I didn’t
post that on Facebook either. I didn’t post it on [Sina] Weibo because I
think it will end up getting censored. (P5)
I might [post more if there is no censorship]. In most people’s mind they
have this self-censorship thing not only about political stuff. You think
about it before you post it. There two ways to think about this, if it’s
inappropriate materials, then I don’t think I’ll post more of them . . . For
political discussion, I might post more. I might feel more free to discuss
about these things if there’s no censorship against any political stuff. (P10)
My participants also avoided the “responsibility” of posting sensitive content by
using the reposting functionality on Chinese social media to echo the controversial
opinion they agreed with instead of authoring their own posts. The participants felt
that they would not be held responsible for creating sensitive content on Chinese
social media by reposting.
If I see something I agree with, I would repost that post instead of stating
my own opinions because if I had posted my own opinions, I get troubles
with that. If I repost something I agree with, I wouldn’t be responsible if
they try to prosecute me. (P11)
3.3.3 RQ2. On-platform Effects
Next I examine the effect censorship has on-platform: the residual traces of behavior
after an act of censorship occurs.
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3.3.3.1 RQ2.1. Censorship suppresses speech, but the effect wears out over time.
For a few participants who had their posts censored on Sina Weibo, the treatment of
censorship did not drastically change their social media behavior. Rather, censorship
cultivated a sense of caution.
For that article [that was censored], I just deleted. I changed the way to
say my things and deleted the sensitive word. After that I don’t know what
the sensitive words are so I was aware of those and more conscious than
before but still it’s a passive thing and I don’t know until they remind me if
it is a sensitive content or not. I don’t remember if my behavior changed
or not but at least in my mind, there’s some change. (P7)
I didn’t do anything differently. It just like a demonstration of censorship
on the Internet. Before my post was deleted by the government, I just
heard of this kind of thing and I saw something like that but it happened
on someone else. But when my post was deleted I just realized everything
is true. The censorship really exists. I’m quite used to it. I’m really
familiar with this thing but I think it’s kinda useless. (P8)
However, what happens when we look at scale? Next, I examine the total post-
ing activities 30 days before and after the focus dates of our treatment and control
groups. Figure 5 shows the chart of the total posting activities, by day, from both
the treatment group and the control group. The y-axis shows the total number of
posts per day from each group, i.e., the sum of posts per day per user. The x-axis
shows the day away from the focus date and centered on Day 0, the focus date.
The plot shows spikes on Day 0 in both groups because users had to post at least
once on their respective focus dates (the definition of focus dates). We can observe
from this plot a similar pattern from users in both the treatment and control groups.















Figure 5: Comparison of the total posting activities 30 days before and after the focus
dates between the control and the treatment groups. Spikes on Day 0 represent the
definition of focus dates. See section for details.
on Day 0, users in the treatment group have a larger increase in the posting intensity
than the control group—17.4% increase from Day -1 to Day 0 in the control group
vs 24.7% increase in the treatment group. Then, the posting activities drop after
Day 0. When we look closer around the center of the x-axis, we can see that the
treatment-group activities started to steeply increase 2 days before Day 0. Then, the
activities sharply drop right after Day 0.
To examine how the on-platform effect of censorship propagates through time, I
compared the group posting activities before and after the focused dates in different
intervals. Figure 6 shows the comparison of group posting activities from the treat-
ment group and the control group in the intervals of 1, 3, 5, 7, 14, and 30 days before
and after the focus dates.
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Table 3: Proportion of change in group posting activities and paired Mann-Whitney
test of posting activities before and after the focused dates, by interval.
Interval
Control Treatment
change U change U
1 0.64% 2233800 -16.15% 4779500***
3 0.81% 20800000 -11.19% 45257000***
5 -0.68% 53678000* -9.00% 127030000***
7 -1.67% 105870000** -7.87% 250550000***
14 -3.51% 432170000*** -8.21% 983250000***
30 -5.29% 2049600000*** -9.20% 4565400000***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.0001
Figure 6 shows that the differences between the control-group posting activity
before and after the focus dates do not differ significantly in most intervals. On
the other hand, the treatment-group posting levels before and after censorship are
significantly different in all intervals. For all intervals, speech is reduced.
To confirm the visual findings from Figure 6, I perform paired Mann-Whitney U
tests on the posting activities before and after the focus dates to see if the changes
in activity are statistically significant. Table 3 shows the results of those tests.
Paired Mann-Whitney tests confirm that in short intervals, the changes in control-
group posting activity were not statistically significant. On the other hand, in the
longer intervals—7, 14, and 30 days—the reductions in posting activity were statisti-
cally significant.
In contrast, the reductions in treatment-group posting activity are statistically
significant in all intervals (p < 10−16 in all intervals). The drop in posting activity is
more drastic when in the intervals immediately after censorship than the farther out
intervals. In comparison to the control group, having posts censored definitely has
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Figure 6: Group posting activities by interval around focus dates.
3.3.3.2 RQ2.2. Censorship does not, in any meaningful way, drive users away
from Chinese social media.
Beyond posting activity, I also inspected the effect of censorship at the account level.
In the same intervals as before, I totaled how many users have abandoned their
accounts by group. Figure 7 shows the plot of proportion of users who abandoned
their accounts in each interval by group.
The graph shows the proportion of users who abandoned their accounts are smaller





















Figure 7: Proportion of users from the treatment and control group who abandoned
their accounts in each interval.
group abandoned their accounts than the control group. Table 4 shows the pro-
portion of users who abandoned their accounts and corresponding results of non-
parametric equality of proportion tests without continuity correction between the
treatment group and the control group, for each interval. It confirms the visual
findings that the proportions of abandoned treatment user accounts are significantly
different than the control.
However, in the 30-day interval, the abandoned proportion of the treatment group
starts to catch up with the proportion of the control group. If this trend continues,
we might see results showing that the abandoned proportion of both groups are equal
once the interval period gets longer.
Our interview participants confirmed this finding from the quantitative analysis.
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Table 4: Proportion of users from the treatment and control group who abandoned
their accounts in each interval and their corresponding equality of proportions tests.
Interval Control Treatment χ2(df = 1) p
1 12.28% 17.96% 65.578 10−16
3 7.28% 11.11% 45.432 10−11
5 4.64% 8.39% 59.093 10−14
7 3.26% 6.75% 64.418 10−15
14 2.15% 5.05% 60.462 10−15
30 1.33% 3.55% 51.220 10−13
Despite the awareness of censorship on Chinese social media and its perceived effects,
almost all of our participants agreed that they still want to keep using Chinese social
media, even though they now have access to Western social media. Unsurprisingly,
the main reason to keep using Chinese social media was to maintain contact with their
friends and family members who are still in China and only have access to Chinese
social media.
No, [I will] definitely not [stop using Chinese social media], because we just
connect with friends and follow some celebrities. Most users of Western
social media are westerners and they are not that close to Chinese people.
I don’t think I will quit WeChat or [Sina] Weibo even I can use Facebook
or something else. (P8)
3.3.3.3 On-platform Effects: Chinese social media users temporarily reduce their
participation in response to censorship.
The findings show that in both RQ2.1 and RQ2.2, the on-platform effects of cen-
sorship are stronger in the short period following censorship. In RQ2.1, censored
users reduced their posting activity more heavily immediately after censorship. Also,
RQ2.2 shows that users eventually effectively return to Chinese social media regard-
less of their treatment of censorship. All the effects that we observed are temporary,
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and the magnitude of the effects shrinks over time.
From a design perspective, Chinese social media has been bringing users into other
activities besides posting status updates. A considerable portion of the participants
claimed that they prefer to keep using Chinese social media over Western social
media because the design of Chinese social media and its features were more suitable
to Chinese culture. As P2 reported, there were more activities that users can perform
on Chinese social media such as buying movie tickets and sending money to friends,
none of which cannot be accomplished on Western social media.
3.4 Discussion
Borrowing the language of Distributed Cognition [48], we saw that censorship on
Chinese social media has influenced user behavior more off-platform than on-platform.
Chinese social media users did feel the effects of censorship but these effects were not
translated into very large observable online behaviors. Next, I review and discuss
each of the findings surrounding our research questions in turn.
3.4.1 RQ1. Off-platform Self-censorship Around Controversial Topics
Previous research [88] observed Chinese social media users rephrasing their posts
once they get censored. Looking at RQ1.1 and RQ1.2 together, my study found that
there is a mismatch between users’ concept of censorship and the actual censorship
mechanisms behind Chinese social media. This discrepancy leads to an inability
to understand censorship signals, so users might try to make sense of the censorship
model by conducting their own little experiments to better understand the censorship
mechanisms.
On the contrary, once user cognition becomes too overloaded, they might just
give up posting, as [95] reported that censorship discouraged social media users to
contribute to the sites. Although the participants were aware of censorship on the
platform, no one knew for sure how censorship works. Before posting to Chinese
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social media, users were unable to make an informed decision whether their posts
would be censored or not (RQ1.1). Consequently, users were also unclear about what
risks—both online and in real life—were associated with getting censored on social
media (RQ1.2). Therefore, self-censoring seems to be the way out for users, both
to reduce the cognitive load and to avoid any unforeseeable consequences with their
posting on Chinese social media.
3.4.2 RQ2. On-platform Effects Diminish Over Time
The findings from the quantitative analysis illustrate that censorship has statistically
significant effects on user participation on Chinese social media. But those effects are
small in real terms. In the 30-day period after censorship, the treatment group users
lowered their participation on Chinese social media by 3.91% more than the control
group. Additionally, the number of treatment users who presumably abandoned their
accounts in the same time period was 2.22% more than the control group. However,
as I presented in the previous section, these numbers become smaller in magnitude
once the time intervals grow.
Our interview participants complemented the findings by expressing that they did
not feel that censorship had an effect on their usage of Chinese social media. Fur-
thermore, those who experienced censorship reported that the effects were intrinsic
rather than extrinsic. In other words, censorship has taken root in the participants’
minds; it has become automatic for our participants to self-censor before they get to
the text box to post.
In this study, the k-day abandonment of censored Chinese social media accounts
peaked immediately after censorship, but eventual account abandonment was rare.
From the interview findings, participants report remaining on Chinese social media
to keep contact with their friends and family members in China. Some even preferred
Chinese social media services over their Western counterparts because of designs and
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features that integrate into their daily routines.
3.5 Limitations
One of the major limitations in this work is my selection of interview participants.
As addressed in the Methods section, I only included the interview participants who
were physically in the US to limit the risks to participants. This decision heavily
skewed the participant pool. Therefore, my interview participant pool was not a
representative of general Chinese social media users. The interview responses seen in
my study can potentially be one-sided due to the participants having higher education
levels than average Chinese Internet users. Previous research suggests that Chinese
Internet users with higher education levels tend to have an opposing view towards
censorship on the Internet [112].
Nevertheless, my interview questions mainly targeted the participants’ experi-
ences with censorship on the Chinese Internet rather than their opinions and atti-
tudes towards the practice of censorship. Moreover, the results presented show mixed
responses from participants regarding their experiences with censorship. There is no
perfect way to achieve a representative sample of Chinese Internet users: conducting
this study within China could also lead to a skewed participant pool because of the
self-selection of participants. I believe that the choices I made in this study were
justified by ethical concerns.
The other limitation is with the datasets. While Sina Weibo does provide open
APIs for developers to interact with the platform, the APIs are heavily restricted and
offer little to no access to researchers for the purpose of gathering user information.
I had to resort to the data collection from the web interface as done by previous
researchers [43, 60]. Hence, I was not able to gather as much data as I would like to
explore the long-term effects of censorship.
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3.6 Design Implications
As a social computing researcher, I see an opportunity to help Chinese social media
users in the process of authoring posts. As discussed in the previous section, there
are many factors that are involved in users’ decision making process when posting.
One factor which heavily impacts user participation is the confusing and opaque
censorship apparatus. Although there are numerous works in the literature that aim
to help users circumvent censorship [15, 35, 39, 86], none of them integrates into
users’ social media routines. By using the technology of [124], for example, I see an
opportunity to make censorship on Chinese social media more transparent to users.
This way, users can have a clearer understanding of what content is censored at what
time, as opposed to the current practice of the censorship “guessing game.”
In the next chapters, I outline the algorithm that eventually drives the I system
that will relieve the cognitive load of Chinese social media users by bringing more
awareness of censorship to Chinese social media users.
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CHAPTER IV
ALGORITHMICALLY BYPASSING CENSORSHIP ON
CHINESE SOCIAL MEDIA
As with traditional media, social media in China exists under the watchful eyes of
government censors. Censorship on Chinese Internet has been established since its
inception. Without much relaxation from the government, Internet users in China
gradually accept that censorship is normal and adapt to live with it [112]. Neverthe-
less, in limited cases, activists have employed homophones of censored keywords to
avoid detection by keyword matching algorithms. Based on King et al.’s censorship
decision tree [61], I speculated that it may be possible to consistently subvert censor-
ship mechanisms by bypassing the initial review, thereby increasing the chance that
posts will be published immediately. The key insight is to computationally alter the
content of a post by replacing censored keywords with their homophones. As this
is already an emergent practice on Chinese social media today [18, 38, 47, 125], I
expected that the transformation would still allow native speakers to understand the
original intent of the posts, given their awareness of the general topic of the posts. At
the same time, the use of homophones may also allow the posts to bypass automatic
keyword detection, since the posts no longer contain censored keywords. Ideally, the
process of generating homophones to replace censored keywords would also not con-
verge on only a handful of homophones for any given censored keyword. If it did, the
censorship apparatus could easily augment their keyword dictionaries with commonly
used homophones; rather, a non-deterministic, “maximum entropy” approach would
likely add confusion and workload to current censorship apparatus.
In order to develop such algorithm, I chose Sina Weibo, the largest Chinese social
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Figure 8: An overview of the datasets, methods, algorithms and experiments.
media with more than 222 million monthly active users [111], to be the target platform
for this experiment. There were three research questions that I answered through this
part of work:
RQ1. Are homophone-transformed posts treated differently from ones that would
have otherwise been censored? Do they bypass the existing censorship apparatus,
lasting longer on Sina Weibo?
RQ2. Are homophone-transformed posts understandable by native Chinese speak-
ers? In transformed posts, can native speakers identify transformed terms and their
original forms?
RQ3. If so, in what rational ways might Sina Weibo’s censorship mechanisms
respond? What costs may be associated with those adaptations?
Figure 8 presents an overview of the methods employed in this work.
4.1 Datasets
I obtained two datasets to explore these research questions. The first dataset consists
of 4,441 posts that were confirmed to be censored on Sina Weibo. The dataset was
gathered from the site Freeweibo1; Freeweibo curates posts from popular accounts on
Sina Weibo and detects whether each one has been censored. Freeweibo also displays
the top 10 “hot search” keywords that were searched through their website at any
unspecified time period. I obtained all hot search keywords that contain only Chinese
1https://freeweibo.com/en
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characters over a roughly one-month period from October 13, 2014–November 20,
2014, resulting in 43 keywords.
Because Freeweibo does not overtly indicate why each weibo was censored, I as-
sume as ground truth that the hot search keywords were the factor that led to cen-
sorship. I believe that the hot search keywords are a good indication of censored
keywords because of the high frequency for which they were searched on Freeweibo.
If these keywords were not censored, people could simply do a search for them on
Sina Weibo. In this manner, I collected a dataset of 4,441 censored weibos which
were posted from October 2, 2009–November 20, 2014.
The second dataset consists of posts from the public timeline of Sina Weibo. I
used the Sina Weibo Open API to obtain these weibos available, again from October
13, 2014–November 20,2014, accumulating 11,712,617 weibos.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Censored keyword extraction
Puns and morphs are only a few examples of how the usage of Chinese language in the
context of social media often does not follow what is seen in dictionaries. Therefore,
I decided against using a pre-existing dictionary to extract words and phrases from
my censored weibo dataset. Instead, I generated all two, three, and four-character
words/phrases from the censored weibo dataset. The terms that appear less than 10
times in the combined dataset of censored and uncensored weibos were then removed
to ensure that the remaining terms commonly appear in social media. Then, I used
the term frequency, inverse document frequency (tf-idf ) algorithm to calculate the
tf-idf score for each of these terms against the uncensored weibo dataset, treating
each weibo as one document. I considered terms with tf-idf score in the top-decile to
likely be censored keywords. I added to this computationally-inferred list the the hot
search keywords from Freeweibo. In total, I therefore have 608 unique combinations
58
of censored keywords. For each combination, I took the latest weibo in the censored
dataset to form the small dataset of 608 weibos to explore in my experiments. (My
experimental methodologies, explained in greater detail later, carry a cost associated
with each weibo in the dataset. I created a subsample for this reason.)
4.2.2 Homophone generation
Chinese words are a combination of several characters. Each character is a monosyl-
lable and usually depicts its own meaning, contributing to the meaning of the larger
word. Due to the racial and cultural diversity in China, there are numerous dialects
of the spoken language, but only one standardized form of written scripts. In this
work, I focus on Mandarin Chinese, China’s official language. Mandarin Chinese is
a tonal language: each character’s sound can be decomposed to a root sound and its
tone. Some characters convey multiple meanings and might be associated with multi-
ple sounds based on the meanings they convey. While the tone of a sound can change
a word’s meaning, native speakers can often detect an incorrect tone by referring to
its surrounding context.
Each Chinese character appears in written Chinese with a certain frequency—
information my homophone generation procedure employs (to avoid generating very
rare terms). I calculated the character frequency from my Sina Weibo public timeline
corpus, consisting of 12,166 characters with 419 distinct root sounds (ignoring tones).
There are 3,365 characters that have more than one root sound. For those characters,
I assigned the frequency of the character to all sounds equally since I do not have
information about the frequency distribution of the sounds. Then, for each of the 419
root sounds, I calculated the percentile of each character with that root sound based
on its frequency from Da’s character frequency list of Classical and Modern Chinese
[25] to generate a frequency score for each Chinese character.
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Figure 9: A high-level overview of the homophone generation algorithm.
percentile p based on its frequency compared to other characters that also have the
sound r. For each censored word W with characters w1w2 . . . wn, its homophones W̃i
were obtained by combining the homophones of each character w̃1i w̃
2
i . . . w̃
n
i . Then, I





where p is the function that returns the sound percentile of its character parameter.
Figure 9 shows an example of my algorithm generating a homophone for the censored
keyword 政府(government).
Because the characters in the public timeline corpus might include archaic and
rarely used characters, I picked the homophones W̃i that have scores among the
top k to penalize ones that include characters that might be unfamiliar to native
speakers (low frequency). To ensure that the algorithm doesn’t converge on the same
homophone every time, one homophone out of the top k was randomly selected each
time a homophone is requested for W . (In my experiments, I let k = 20.) Note that
the algorithm has a high chance to generate homophones that have no meaning since
I did not consult a dictionary.
Because the algorithm ultimately interacts with censorship adversaries (something
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I describe in more detail in the Cost to adversaries section), I chose to shorten homo-
phones of long censored keywords (4 characters or longer) to 2–3 characters. Strings of
4 or more characters are often compound words and phrases combining other words
to represent more complex concepts. Thus, these long strings appear in the Chi-
nese language with low frequency. In brief, site moderators could simply respond by
adding all homophones of long censored keywords to a keyword ban list with little to
no effect to regular users. At the same time, shortening the keywords might create
confusion for readers due to missing information; however, I will show in Experiment
2 that native speakers can still infer the content of transformed weibos from short-
ened homophones. In my dataset, the maximum length of censored keywords is 5
characters. Therefore, I divided a long homophone in half and take either the prefix
or the suffix of the homophone at random as the transformed keyword to replace the
censored keyword.
4.2.3 Experiments
Experiment 1: Reposting to Sina Weibo.
To answer RQ1, I posted the transformed content weibos to Sina Weibo using
multiple newly created accounts and measured the time it took for the weibos to get
deleted or for the accounts to get banned. For comparison, I also posted originally
censored (untransformed) weibos back to Sina Weibo and measured the same vari-
ables. I used the web interface of Sina Weibo instead of its API to post and retrieve
weibos to minimize the chances of tripping automated defense systems (i.e., those sys-
tems may more aggressively filter programmatic posts arriving from API endpoints).
I retrieved the list of weibos that were still published on the site every minute from a
web browser session that was logged into a separate Sina Weibo account established
for viewing purpose only (following the King et al. [61] method). Thus, the age of
weibos has resolution at the minute timescale. The reason a viewing account was
61
needed is that unregistered visitors can only view the first page of another user’s
timeline. In order to retrieve all of the posts, I needed to access posts in other pages
of the timeline. Research has shown that the majority of censored posts on Sina
Weibo get censored within 24 hours of their posting [61, 124]. Relying on this result,
I monitored the posts from their posting time to 48 hours after they were posted.
Experiment 2: Amazon Mechanical Turk.
To answer RQ2, I employed the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) to hire native Chinese speakers to investigate if they could understand the
homophone-transformed weibos. I showed the workers the transformed weibos, and
provided them with the following instructions: “Please read the following post from a
Chinese social media site. Some word(s) have been replaced with their homophones2.”
Participants were then asked three questions:
1. Which word(s) are the replaced word(s)?
2. Using your best guess, what are the original word(s)?
3. Did you have difficulty understanding its content?
To ensure that the workers who completed the tasks were native Chinese speakers,
the instructions and questions were provided only in Chinese, accompanied with an
English message asking non-Chinese speakers not to complete the task. Each HIT
(Human Intelligent Task) was comprised of four weibos (asking workers to answer a
total of 12 questions.) Workers were paid 20 cents for each HIT they completed, and
they were allowed to complete as many HITs as they wanted, up to 152 HITs (608
weibos.) For each HIT, I obtained completed work from 3 independent workers.
2English translation of original Chinese instructions.
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4.3 Results
Next, I report the results of two controlled experiments designed to explore RQ1 and
RQ2, as well as a mathematical analysis of the likely cost a homophone scheme will
impose on the current censorship apparatus (RQ3).
4.3.1 Experiment 1: Censorship effects
I created 12 new Sina Weibo accounts (excluding viewing-only accounts) for my ex-
periment. For the purpose of reporting the results of the experiment, I define three
mutually exclusive states that my accounts could fall into:
• Active accounts can perform all activities on the site—logging in, posting, read-
ing other users’ timeline. The viewing accounts were able to access their time-
lines.
• Blocked accounts were no longer operable. The login information of blocked ac-
counts caused the site to generate the message “Sorry, your account is abnormal
and cannot be logged in at this time.” When my viewing accounts visited the
timelines of blocked accounts, the message “Sorry, your current account access
is suspect. You cannot access temporarily.” was shown.
• Frozen accounts were awaiting verification. However, when cell phone numbers
were provided for verification, the site always displayed the message “The sys-
tem is busy, please try again,” leaving the accounts in the frozen state and no
longer operable. The login information of frozen accounts always lead to the
verification page. Similar to blocked accounts, the same message was shown
when my viewing accounts visited the timelines of frozen accounts.
Of the 12 accounts that I created, four were blocked and two were frozen, leaving
six active at the end of the experiment.
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For each originally censored weibo in the dataset, I posted it and its homophone-
transformed version (totaling 1,216 weibos) back to Sina Weibo from accounts created
for this experiment. Throughout the rest of the section, I refer to the posts I posted
back to Sina Weibo as original posts and transformed posts based on their conditions.
There were four progressive states that both types of my posts achieved:
• Posted posts are posts that were not blocked at the time of posting. The posters
received the message “Successfully posted” from Sina Weibo when the posts
were sent. Unposted posts caused the site to generate the message “Sorry,
this content violates Weibo Community Management or related regulations and
policies.”
• Published posts are posted posts that my viewing accounts were able to see
within 48 hours after they were posted.
• Removed posts are published posts that my viewing accounts saw at one point
but disappeared from their posters’ timelines at a later time within 48 hours
after they were posted. However, the poster accounts were still active.
• Censored posts are published posts that were not visible at the 48-hour mark
for any reasons, including account termination.
I calculated the age of each of the published posts from the time that I posted
them to Sina Weibo to the last time the viewing accounts saw the posts. Since I
defined posts to be uncensored at the 48-hour mark, I stopped checking a post after
48 hours after the time of its posting. Thus, the age of my posts was capped at 48
hours.
Keyword transformations & censorship.
Of the 1,216 weibos posted to Sina Weibo, 102 posts did not get published (8.39%):
56 original content posts (9.21%) and 46 transformed posts (7.57%). Of the posts
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Table 5: Number of Weibo posts that survived through each stage of censorship.
Original Transformed Total
Posts 608 (100%) 608 (100%) 1,216
Published 552 (90.79%) 576 (94.74%) 1,128
. . . Not Removed 521 (85.69%) 399 (65.63%) 920
. . . Not Censored 326 (53.62%) 337 (55.43%) 663
that did not get published, 7 original posts and 10 transformed posts were not posted
(blocked at the time of posting) (4 posts from the same censored weibos.) Therefore,
in total, 552 originally posts and 576 transformed posts were published, a significant
difference in publishing rate (χ2 = 6.219, p = 0.01).
Out of the 1,128 published posts (552 original and 576 transformed,) 208 of them
were removed (31 original and 177 transformed,) and 465 posts were censored (226
original and 239 transformed.) There is a significant difference in posts being removed
between original and transformed posts (χ2 = 116.538, p < 0.0001) with transformed
posts being removed more, note that transformed posts were more likely to be pub-
lished than original ones. There is no statistical significance between the censorship
of transformed and original content posts. Table 5 shows the number of weibo posts
my viewing accounts observed after each stage of censorship. For the removed posts,
the transformation of censored keywords allowed posts to last longer on Sina Weibo
than the original posts (W = 1830, p < 0.01). The mean adjusted age of the removed
transformed posts was 3.94 hours (σ = 5.51) and the mean for the removed original
content posts was 1.3 hours (σ = 1.25), a threefold difference.
Age of weibos & censorship.
To figure out whether the original posted dates of the censored weibos also have
an effect on removal of the published transformed and original posts, I accounted for
the variation in the distribution of the posted dates of censored weibos in the dataset

























Figure 10: Proportion of removed posts surviving censorship, normalizing to posts’
adjusted age. X-axis: Adjusted age; Y-axis: Proportion of removed posts.
and the number of censored weibos, based on the month the censored weibos were
originally posted.
There is a significant positive correlation between the posted dates of censored
weibos and the percentage of original posts removed (ρ = 0.6478, p < 0.0001). The
correlation between the posted date and the percentage of transformed posts removed
is also statistically significant (ρ = 0.6434, p < 0.0001).
The results of Experiment 1 show that posts with censored keywords replaced
with their homophones have a higher tendency to pass through automatic keyword
detection and consequently, getting published to other users and the public on Sina
Weibo. While there is no significant association between posts ultimately getting
censored and whether they were transformed, the age of transformed posts were
significantly higher than original posts before they were removed.
4.3.2 Experiment 2: Interpretability
In Experiment 2, 22 workers completed 456 assignments. Each assignment contains
4 different transformed weibos, resulting in 1,824 impressions of my 608 transformed
weibos. Out of 1,824 impressions, in only 52 impressions (2.85%) Tukers indicated
that they had difficulty understanding the content of the transformed weibos. There
were 46 transformed weibos that created confusion for 1 worker, and 3 transformed
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weibos created confusion for 2 workers. There were no weibos that created confusion
for all 3 workers. Table 6 summarizes the statistics of weibos and worker impressions
that reported confusion.
Upon close inspection of the 3 weibos that caused 2 workers difficulties with con-
tent comprehension, 1 weibo was a reply to other weibos and had omitted some parts
of the thread such as original text and images. The other 2 weibos were all originally
posted in 2013, nearly 2 years prior to my study. Although these weibos were dis-
cussing current events at the time, all had important keywords of each story replaced
by their homophones.
To evaluate whether the workers were able to identify the transformed keywords
and the original censored keywords, I considered an answer from the workers to be
correct if either (1) it was the same as the keyword, (2) it was a substring of the
keyword, or (3) the keyword was its substring. Then, I calculated the portion of
correct keywords as a correctness score. Out of 1,824 impressions, there were 617
(33.83%) that were able to detect all the transformed keywords in the weibo, and
1,200 (65.79%) detected at least half of the transformed keywords. 539 impressions
(29.55%) were able to guess all the original censored keywords, and 1,091 (59.81%)
were able to guess at least half of the original keywords. There were 517 impressions
(28.34%) that were able to detect all transformed keywords and guessed the original
words correctly. Surprisingly, 3 of them, with 3 different censored weibos, reported
that they were still confused with the content of the weibos.
Logistic regressions predicting whether the workers were confused with the content
of the weibos from the correctness score of both transformed keywords and original
keywords show significant effects (p = 0.03 for transformed keywords and p < 0.001
for original keywords), with the correctness score for the original keywords having a
steeper slope. However, the number of censored keywords and the combined length
of all censored keywords do not have significant effects on the correctness scores of
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Table 6: Number of impressions, weibos and workers’ understanding of weibo content.
Impressions Weibos
Total 1,824 (100%) 608 (100%)
Confusing 52 (2.85%) –
. . . to 1 worker – 46 (7.57%)
. . . to 2 workers – 3 (0.49%)
No Confusion 1,772 (97.15%) 559 (91.94%)
both transformed and original keywords, neither do they have significant effects on
workers’ understanding of the content of weibos.
In summary, I found that in 65% of the impressions, Turkers were able to detect
at least half of the homophones of the censored keywords, and more than half of the
impressions were able to guess original censored keywords themselves. The ability to
identify the homophones and guess the original keywords demonstrates understanding
of the content of the weibos. For 605 out of 608 of the transformed posts in my dataset,
the majority of workers were able to understand the content from reading only the
transformed posts.
4.3.3 Analysis: Cost to adversaries
Finally, I explored what steps the current censorship machinery (an adversarial re-
lationship in this context, and hereafter referred to as “adversaries”) would need to
adapt to the technique introduced in this chapter, as well as what costs might be
associated with those adaptations. As the homophones scheme introduces consider-
able “noise” and false positives into the weibo stream, it is likely cost adversaries
valuable time and human resources. Adversaries seem likely to resort to two possible
counter-measures, one machine-based and the other human-oriented. First, censors
could simply add all possible homophones for a given censored term to the keyword
ban list. Alternatively, censors might counter homophones with more human labor
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to sort homophones standing in for censored keywords from coincidences (uses of my
homophones that are not associated with censored terms). In either case, adversaries
will have to deal with a potentially large number of false positives generated by my
approach. Next, I analyzed how many false positive they can expect to deal with
on average. In the machine-based solutions, these would amount to inadvertently
blocked weibos; in the human labor case, these false positives would amount extra
human labor that would need to be expended.
From the dataset of 4,441 censored weibos, there were a total of 422 censored key-
words, and my algorithm generated 8,400 unique homophones that have the frequency
score in the top k = 20. I calculated the document frequency (one weibo treated as
one document) of the homophones in my public timeline corpus as a measure of how
commonly these homophone phrases appear in Chinese social media. (This calcula-
tion is used as an alternative to querying the search Sina Weibo API, due to the API
call limit.) My calculation may be considered the lower bound on how common the
phrases are actually used in social media communication.
For each censored keyword W with the top-20 homophones W̃1...W̃k, I calculated
the false positives generated by calculating the average document frequency of all
homophones. In the case that W is composed of 4 or more characters, I considered
the document frequency of all possible shortened keywords to be the number of false
positive generated.
Then, for each censored keyword W , I calculated the average false positives gener-
ated over all of its homophones. I then calculated the average false positive generated
in my dataset over all censored keywords. Algorithm 1 summarizes this process in
pseudocode, the method used to calculate the number of false positive weibos for each
censored keyword.
On average, each of the censored keywords matches 5,510 weibos in the uncensored
corpus. The uncensored sample corpus is only a fraction of the actual posts on Sina
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Algorithm 1: Estimating false positive weibos
AverageFP
Data: U : Uncensored weibo corpus
Input: W : Censored keyword
Output: k̄: Average number of false positives for W
k ← EstimateFP (W )
k̄ ← k/|GenHphone(W )|
return k̄
EstimateFP
Data: U ← Uncensored weibo corpus
Input: W ← Censored keyword
Output: k ← Number of weibos matching W ’s homophones
for W̃i in GenHphone(W ) do
n← len(W )
if n < 4 then
Si ← {u ∈ U : u contains W̃i}
else
W̃ ′i ← {all shortened versions of W̃i}





Weibo; there are approximately 100 million weibos made daily on Sina Weibo [124].
Scaling the figure above to the actual amount of weibos sent daily, the transformation
would match an average of 47,000 false-positive weibos per day, per censored keywords.
With 422 censored keywords (perhaps an under-approximation of the actual number
of censored terms at work at any given time), there would be nearly 20 million false
positive weibos each day, or approximately 20% of weibos sent daily.
The other option, given the current state of censorship on Sina Weibo, would be
human review. Given that an efficient censorship worker can read approximately 50
weibos per minute [124], it would take more than 15 new human-hours each day to
filter the false-positive weibos generated from each homophone-transformed keywords.
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4.4 Discussion
First, I found that while homophone-transformed weibos ultimately get censored at
the same rate as unaltered ones, they last on the site an average of three times longer
than unaltered posts. It seems likely that this extra time would permit messages
to spread to more people—possibly providing more time to forward the message to
others. In Experiment 2, I found that Turkers who natively speak Chinese can inter-
pret the altered message. The datasets and methods used in this chapter somewhat
divorce weibos from their natural context: the weibos used here come from the past
and Turkers are not the intended recipients (i.e., they don’t follow the person who
wrote them). Therefore, the set-up of Experiment 2 presents a relatively challenging
environment for re-interpretation, one that I would argue suggests that in natural
settings this method would prove highly usable. Finally, given the very large number
of false positives this mechanism would introduce to the current censorship apparatus,
it seems unfeasible that simply adding all possible homophones to a ban list would
sufficiently address the new technique. It would interfere with too much otherwise
innocuous conversation happening on Sina Weibo. (After all, Sina Weibo exists in
the first place to permit this conversation to happen in a controlled space.) Rather,
it seems likely that additional human effort would have to be used to counteract the
technique presented here; the costs associated with that intervention appear steep,
as discussed in the section above.
Turning to the results of Experiment 1, it may seem counter-intuitive that a large
number of originally censored posts can now be successfully posted to Sina Weibo.
There are two main explanations for this. First, the accounts that I used to post
these weibos were newly created accounts without any followers. In contrast, the
accounts that originally posted censored weibos were popular accounts with thou-
sands of followers. Therefore, the adversaries might have been more lenient with my
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accounts since the reach of the posts were considerably lower than those censored wei-
bos. Second, the censored weibos were not presently topical. Some of the censored
weibos in my dataset discussed events that ended long before the time I posted them
back to Sina Weibo. Consequently, the posts about these events might no longer be
under adversaries’ watch, as we can see from the positive correlation between the
original posted dates of censored weibos and the percentage of posts removed. For
this reason, I measured the relative decrease in censorship after applying homophone
transformations to my corpus.
Using homophones to transform censored keywords proved easy to understand
by native speakers from the results of Experiment 2. None of the workers were
confused with the content of 559 out of 608 (91.94%) transformed weibos, and the
majority of the workers understood nearly all of my posts (605 out of 608 posts,
99.51%). Of course, workers need to have some background knowledge of the topics
of the posts. Workers that could not identify the transformed keywords did not have
an awareness of the topic nor the surrounding context. My results show a significant
correlation between inability to identify transformed keywords and original keywords,
and confusion with the content. It is clear that transforming censored keywords into
homophones does not prohibit native speakers from understanding the content of the
posts.
4.5 Limitations
For practical and ethical reasons, I did not re-appropriate existing accounts for use
in my experiments. They might be compromised and potentially even endanger the
people operating them. Although the Real Name Policy is not implemented on Sina
Weibo [117], existing accounts might contain personal information that can be linked
to real identities of account holders. Therefore, I used all newly created accounts
with anonymous email addresses and, when requested for verification, anonymous cell
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phone numbers to protect the safety and privacy of all parties involved. Consequently,
the effects that I see in my experiments may differ in the context of well-established
accounts.
4.6 Design implications & future work
The results suggest that it may be possible to construct a tool to automatically gener-
ate homophones of known censored keywords to circumvent censorship on Sina Weibo.
With further engineering, all computational components in this chapter—censored
and uncensored weibos crawlers, the censored keywords extraction algorithm, as well
as the homophone generation algorithm—can likely be put to work together to create
a tool to combat censorship in Chinese social media in real-time. Miniaturizing and
scaling these technological components (for example, to live in the browser), will take
effort, but is likely possible. In the next chapter, I detail the development of the real-
time system, CENSE, that utilizes the algorithms presented in this chapter to help




REAL-TIME SYSTEM TO CIRCUMVENT CENSORSHIP
ON CHINESE SOCIAL MEDIA
Previous research and my previous work, discussed in the previous two chapters,
presented promising directions towards developing viable methods of circumventing
censorship on Chinese social media. However, to date, there have been no attempts
to develop such systems to aid Chinese social media users in doing so.
Based on the results of my study presented in Chapter 3, censorship causes re-
duced participation on Chinese social media, even though the majority of Chinese
Internet users do not broadcast sensitive speech that might be subject to censorship.
A synthesis of the results of my interview study with Chinese social media users and
of the quantitative analysis of Chinese social media data presented in Chapter 3 moti-
vated the implementation of an automated system, CENSE, that will not only allow
Chinese social media users to circumvent censorship but also make the censorship
model transparent to users.
Figure 11 shows the interface of the front-end client of CENSE. Users of CENSE
are instantly informed when their posts contain one or more censored keywords. Then,
users are presented with homophone suggestions as possible replacements for those
words. Furthermore, the front-end client of CENSE allows users to manually edit
the suggested post to match their own preferences. Behind the front-end client,
CENSE is powered by three modules in the back-end server, all of which run on a
single server instance (currently hosted on the Georgia Tech network). The three
modules work together to gather censored and uncensored posts from Sina Weibo,
extract censored keywords from both types of posts, and generate homophones of
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Figure 11: CENSE system integrated into Sina Weibo webpage. The system detected
that the post “中国是世界之最像古巴的国家” （“China is the world’s most similar
country to Cuba”) contains two censored keywords/phrases: world’s most (sh̀ı jiè zhī
zùı) and Cuba (gǔ bā). The system then gives a suggestion to change the post to “中
国是是接至最像故八的国家” (“China is connected to the most similar former eight
countries”) where the two censored keywords were replaced by their homophones:
connected to the most (sh̀ı jiē zh̀ı zùı) and former eight (gǔ bā), respectively.
these censored keywords based on the algorithm presented in Chapter 4. Together,
the front-end client and the back-end server function as a real-time system to aid
Chinese social media users in circumventing censorship.
Before describing the implementation of the system later in this chapter, I first
present the formative interview study designed to assess the opinions of Chinese social
media users regarding the use of a censorship circumvention tool on Chinese social
media. The details of the design and implementation of CENSE system components
are then presented along with the results of user evaluation of the front-end client
design. Finally, I present screenshots of a use case scenario of the CENSE system
before concluding this chapter with discussions on system limitations and future work
stemmed from this system.
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5.1 Chinese Social Media Users’ Opinions on a Censorship
Circumvention Tool
As a part of the interview study regarding the usage of Chinese social media under
censorship presented in Chapter 3, participants of that interview study were also
asked questions regarding practices and additional tools they employ to circumvent
censorship on Chinese social media. Specifically, I explored two primary research
questions with this part of the study:
RQ1. What are the current techniques used to circumvent censorship?
RQ2. How would the circumvention tool, if available, be incorporated
into daily social media use?
After first summarizing the research methods used in the interview study. I present
the semi-structured interview questions and the results of the interviews. I then
conclude this section with takeaways obtained from the interviews and describe how
the interview study shaped my development of CENSE, a censorship circumvention
tool.
5.1.1 Methods
Participants in the interview study were the same group that participated in the other
interview study presented in Chapter 3. To summarize, participants were carefully
selected based on the following criteria to minimize risks associated with participating
in the study due to the sensitive nature of the interview topic:
1. Participants were Chinese citizens to ensure that they were familiar with the
culture, politics, and Internet of China.
2. Participants were located in the US to facilitate in-person or domestic-US phone
call interviews to mitigate risks and protect participants’ identities and security.
3. To ensure that they were familiar with Chinese social media, participants were
users of Chinese social media.
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During the interviews, participants were first asked questions designed to answer
the research questions presented in Chapter 3. Next, they were asked questions
aimed at answering the research questions presented in this section, i.e., ones that
involved their knowledge of censorship circumvention techniques and their opinions
on automated censorship circumvention tools. The interview questions based on the
research questions presented in this section are presented next.
Additional details of the participant recruitment process and the interview sessions
are described in Chapter 3.
5.1.1.1 Interview Questions
1. Are there any techniques that you use to circumvent censorship? What are
they?
(a) Where did you learn those techniques?
(b) Do you observe other people using the same techniques?
2. How effective are the techniques that you use in your experience?
3. How do you adapt the techniques to make sure that you keep up with new
censorship practices?
4. If there were a tool that automatically warns you that your posts could be
censored before you post them, would you use it? How would you use it?
(a) How effective do you think the tool would be in helping you circumvent
censorship?
(b) Would you participate more on the sites?
5. If the tool also suggests that you change some words to avoid censorship, would
you use this tool? How would you use it?
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(a) How effective do you think the tool would be in helping you circumvent
censorship?
(b) Would you participate more on the sites?
5.1.2 Results
The results of the interview study are grouped into two sections. First, censorship
circumvention techniques reported by the participants are presented to provide the
context of participants’ awareness of censorship circumvention techniques. Then,
participants’ opinions on an automated censorship circumvention tool are reported.
5.1.2.1 Censorship Circumvention Technique
Nearly all of the 11 participants admitted to knowing techniques designed to circum-
vent censorship on Chinese social media. Specifically, the two techniques mentioned
by the participants were word substitution (e.g. replacing sensitive words with ho-
mophones) and word manipulation (e.g. inserting symbols between characters in a
word).
Using generic name or a different name. Chinese characters have a lot of
things sound alike. For example, a lot of people on Sina Weibo are now
calling Jiang Zhemin “toad.” If you see that then it’s definitely mentioning
him by the name. (P1)
In Chinese social media, if you write a word, you can write comma in
between the words and that doesn’t get censored, and people can still un-
derstand. (P2)
Despite their awareness of censorship circumvention techniques, almost all partic-
ipants had never used these techniques themselves for two main reasons. First, the
participants did not post content involving sensitive topics on Chinese social media.
Thus, they did not see the need to replace sensitive words when posting. Second,
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the participants usually did not know what words were considered “sensitive” at any
given time. Therefore, they could not identify which words in their posts to replace.
5.1.2.2 Usefulness and Effectiveness of an Automated Censorship Circumvention
Tool
When the concept of an automated tool to circumvent censorship was presented to
them during interviews, participants were asked to evaluate the usefulness of the
proposed tool. Five out of 11 participants stated that they believed the tool would
be useful if it were not too intrusive.
Maybe it will be helpful before you add little characters between the words,
you know which words will be censored, you know where to add the char-
acters. (P2)
I guess it would be like a spell check so I would see what I’m writing about
is OK if it is then I would post it. (P5)
These five participants who stated they would find the tool useful predicated its
effectiveness in circumventing censorship on its ability to detect sensitive keywords,
and on whether post contents were understandable despite the noise created by the
tool’s manipulating the post’s words.
If the tool knows all the censorship of sensitive words then it will be ef-
fective. I hope that the government won’t notice this tool otherwise they
might block this tool also. (P7)
I think that would be more effective than using the same derived words but
the potential problem is if the readers will be able to understand because
it’s kind of an encrypted message. (P5)
Four out of 11 participants explicitly stated that they did not think an automated
tool to help circumvent censorship on Chinese social media would be helpful. These
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participants raised three issues in support of this view. First, two participants raised
the concern that the tool would emphasize the limitations of freedom on Chinese
social media. Having a tool that explicitly warns social media users that their posts
might be censored could make users angry and drive them away from social media
platforms.
I think it will make people feel like we are not free in China. . . I don’t like
this feeling. Once you type something and it tells you that your words are
sensitive on Sina Weibo, it makes me feel bad that I won’t use Sina Weibo
anymore. The tool will make me want to post less on Sina Weibo. (P6)
The second issue was related to users’ trust in the tool. Two of the four partic-
ipants expressed concern that the tool would not be useful because they could not
trust it. People might suspect that the tool was released by the Chinese government
as simply another way to suppress speech.
I think this kind of tool will make people angry. They will think the tool
is made by the government. People don’t want to be limited. (P6)
I don’t think that will be useful because people know they will get censored.
I don’t trust those tools because it will tell me I will get censored but how
do those tools know I’m getting censored. They can’t get into the mind of
the manual censors. (P11)
Finally, one participant said that he/she did not find the tool useful because
he/she would never post something of a sensitive nature on Chinese social media.
I don’t think it will be useful to me personally because I don’t post these
things. I feel posts getting deleted is far away from my life, so I wouldn’t
feel like it’s too useful for me. I would be curious how it works and see
but using it in a daily basis, I don’t think so. (P10)
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The other two out of 11 participants refrained from commenting on the usefulness
of the tool until they could see it in action.
The next subsection explains how the results of the interview study helped inform
design decisions of CENSE, the censorship circumvention system that I developed.
5.1.3 Design Implications
The results of the interview study showed that most participants who are Chinese
social media users believe that a censorship circumvention tool would be helpful
in their social media routine if the tool does not interfere with their social media
experiences.
Comments from the participants who did not find the tool useful were used to
inform design decisions to ensure users’ trust in the tool and to ensure that the tool
encourages rather than suppresses user participation in Chinese social media.
Thus, the interview study informed a few key design elements of the censorship
circumvention system:
• The system should blend seamlessly with Chinese social media.
• The system must be unobtrusive.
• The system should encourage user participation in Chinese social media to gain
users’ trust.
In the next sections, I detail the technology behind the CENSE system and how
I incorporated the design takeaways listed above into the development of the system.
5.2 System Components
The system CENSE consists of two main components: a back-end server and a front-
end client. The back-end server utilizes the homophone transformation algorithm
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Figure 12: Components of the CENSE system.
presented in Chapter 4 that I created to detect censored keywords and suggest cor-
responding homophone replacements. The front-end client interacts with users, al-
lowing them to replace detected censored keywords on their social media posts with
homophones.
Figure 12 shows interactions among the different modules in the back-end server,
interactions between the front-end client and the back-end server, and the interactions
between users and the front-end client.
The next two sections detail the design of the back-end server and the front-end
client components.
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5.3 Back-end Server Design
The back-end server component of CENSE facilitates the system’s logical operations,
i.e. the back-end server handles the data mining process that extracts current cen-
sored keywords on Chinese social media. Additionally, the back-end server finds
homophone replacements for censored keywords. This back-end server consists of
three modules: the Social Media Stream Watcher, the Censored Keywords Extractor,
and the Homophone Transformer. Figure 13 shows how the data flow between these
different components of the back-end server.
5.3.1 Social Media Stream Watcher
In order for the system to be up to date on current keywords that are prone to cen-
sorship, it must constantly monitor both censored and uncensored posts on Chinese
social media, and use this data to detect censored keywords. In my previous work
described in Chapter 4, both censored and uncensored posts were only obtained once
from a Chinese social media site and a Chinese social media curator. Extending this
previous work, the new module was developed to constantly monitor a Chinese social
media stream of uncensored posts (in this case, the public timeline of Sina Weibo)
and a stream of known censored posts (in this case, censored posts on Sina Weibo
curated by Weiboscope).
Since the posts from Sina Weibo’s public timeline stream are already published
on the platform, they have already passed the automated filter. My system compares
the posts from Sina Weibo’s public timeline to censored posts in order to identify
censored keywords. To monitor for Sina Weibo uncensored posts, I used the Sina
Weibo Open API to monitor the public timeline stream. Sina Weibo Open API has a
rate limit of 150 requests per hour [68], and each request to query the public timeline
returns upto 200 posts. Thus, in one day, I could obtain at most 720,000 uncensored
posts from Sina Weibo (0.72% of 100 million posts made daily). The posts from Sina
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Figure 13: Diagram showing the flow of data between components of the back-end
server.
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Weibo’s public timeline are kept for 30 days to serve as the uncensored corpus for use
by the Censored Keyword Extractor module.
Identifying censored posts on Sina Weibo has proven to be a challenging task due
to Sina Weibo Open API’s rate limit. Fortunately, Weiboscope [38] extensively mon-
itors popular accounts on Sina Weibo for censored posts and makes this data avail-
able to the public. My system continuously obtains Sina Weibo censored posts from
Weiboscope to compare with uncensored posts obtained from Sina Weibo’s public
timeline. The number of daily censored posts on Sina Weibo is minuscule compared
to the number of uncensored posts obtainable from Sina Weibo’s public timeline.
Weiboscope detects approximately 40-50 censored posts per day. However, keywords
that are prone to be censored could remain in the filtering system for an extended
period of time. Therefore, censored posts from a 180-day period form the censored
corpus for the Censored Keyword Extractor module.
5.3.2 Censored Keyword Extractor
Like the censored keywords extraction algorithm presented in Chapter 4, the Censored
Keyword Extractor module utilizes the term frequency-inverse document frequency
(TF-IDF ) technique to extract keywords that appear frequently in the censored cor-
pus but rarely in the uncensored corpus.
Two, three, and four-character words/phrases are extracted from the censored
corpus. Here, I decided to exclude words/phrases that are more than four characters
long because they are not common in the Chinese language. Then, terms that appear
less than 100 times (note that this number is significantly higher than that used in
the technique discussed in Chapter 4 due to the larger datasets employed here) in the
combined censored and uncensored corpora are removed to ensure that those terms
that remain are ones that commonly appear on Chinese social media. With each post
in the uncensored corpus considered to be a document, the TF-IDF score for each
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term from the censored corpus is then calculated. Thus, for a term w:
TF-IDF(w) =
frequency of w in censored corpus
# of posts in uncensored corpus containing w
Then, terms with TF-IDF scores greater than 2.0 are assumed to be censored
keywords. Since the stream of data that feeds into the Censored Keyword Extractor
is now dynamic, I decided to not include any assumed ground truth about words
or phrases that could be censored keywords as I did with Freeweibo’s Hot Search
keywords in Chapter 4.
5.3.3 Homophone Transformer
Using the same mechanism as in the homophone generation algorithm discussed in
Chapter 4, the Homophone Transformer module takes in censored keywords gen-
erated from the previous module. Then, for each keyword W , its homophones
W̃1, W̃2, . . . , W̃n are generated from characters having the same root sounds (ignoring
tones) but in different forms. Then, each homophone W̃i is assigned a score that is
the sum of the frequency percentile of the characters. To ensure that the homophones
generated by the system are ones that commonly appear in the Chinese language, a
homophone with a score in the 20 highest scores is randomly selected to be suggested
to the user as a replacement for the original keywords.
5.4 Back-end Server Implementation
All three modules comprising the back-end server—the Social Media Stream Watcher,
the Censored Keyword Extractor, and the Homophone Transformer—were imple-
mented using Python 2.7. All data are stored in MongoDB, a NoSQL database
service. Currently, the back-end server is deployed on a server instance on the Geor-
gia Tech network. The back-end server is currently running on a machine with a
2.4GHz 16-core processor, 96GB of RAM, and gigabit link to the Internet.
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5.4.1 Social Media Stream Watcher
The Social Media Stream Watcher obtains the latest posts, up to 200 a minute, from
Sina Weibo’s public timeline through the Sina Weibo Open API. After these posts are
segmented into Chinese words using Jieba Chinese text segmentation [102], individual
words are then incorporated into the uncensored corpus and stored in the database.
Additionally, the Social Media Stream Watcher obtains the latest censored posts
from Weiboscope, the Chinese social media curator site. However, since there are
not as many censored posts on Weiboscope as there are posts on Sina Weibo public
timeline, the Social Media Stream Watcher only obtains data from Weiboscope every
30 minutes. After the censored posts are obtained, all two-, three-, and four-character
words are extracted and stored in the censored corpus on the database. I did not
employ Chinese word segmentation on the censored posts since lexicon variations
such as memes, morphs, and homophones that could already be in use, and word
segmentation might misinterpret these variations as parts of other words.
For both the censored and uncensored corpora, the database stores words in the
appropriate table and, along with the words themselves, their total and daily oc-
currence counts. Words in the uncensored corpus (i.e., from the Sina Weibo’s public
timeline) expire 30 days after the day they were obtained, while words in the censored
corpus (from Weiboscope) expire 180 days after the day they were obtained. Once
words expire, they no longer contribute to the total occurrence count. I decided to
expire words in the censored corpus much later than those in the uncensored cor-
pus because otherwise there is not enough data in the uncensored corpus to detect
censored keywords.
5.4.2 Censored Keyword Extractor
The Censored Keyword Extractor compares unexpired words from the censored and
uncensored corpora in the database to detect censored keywords on Sina Weibo.
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Using the total count of words in the database, the Censored Keyword Extractor
can calculate the TF-IDF score for each word in the censored corpus. To ensure
that the censored keywords are ones that appear commonly on Chinese social media,
only the words in the censored corpus that appear more than 100 times (total count
> 100) in the combined censored and uncensored corpora are assigned the TF-IDF
score. Then, I apply the threshold of TF-IDF(w) ≥ 2.0 to ensure that the censored
keywords appear frequently enough among the censored posts. Finally, the keywords
are stored in the database as censored keywords.
The Censored Keyword Extractor executes an extraction once per day to obtain
censored keywords that have appeared on Sina Weibo within the past 24 hours. While
the extractor module can be executed more frequently to catch censored keywords
as they appear on Sina Weibo, my experiments have shown that a 24-hour period is
currently the optimum time period over which to gather enough censored posts from
Weiboscope to run through the TF-IDF algorithm because the number of censored
posts available through Weiboscope is limited.
Once extracted, homophones of censored keywords are generated through the Ho-
mophone Transformer module, which generates the top 20 homophones that are most
likely to appear in the Chinese language. Censored keywords and their homophones
are then maintained in the database of the CENSE system for 30 days.
5.4.3 Homophone Transformer
The Homophone Transformer generates homophones of censored keywords extracted
from the Censored Keyword Extractor module. Currently, the Homophone Trans-
former module utilizes Da’s character frequency list of Classical and Modern Chi-
nese [25] to calculate the probability of a Chinese character appearing in a Chinese
88
language text. The homophones are generated using the algorithm presented in Chap-
ter 4. Once all homophones are generated, the homophones with the 20 highest fre-
quency scores are stored in the database of the CENSE system. When the front-end
client requests a homophone, one of the stored homophones is randomly selected as
a replacement suggestion.
In future work, Da’s character frequency list of Classical and Modern Chinese can
be replaced by the frequency list of Chinese social media gathered from the Social
Media Stream Watcher module.
5.4.4 API Endpoints
To facilitate communication between the back-end server and the front-end client, I
also developed API endpoints on the back-end server side. Two endpoints are needed
in order for the front-end client to function properly.
• /keywords provides the current list of censored keywords stored in the database
on the back-end server. The front-end client utilizes the keywords endpoint to
retrieve this list, which the front-end client uses to determine whether the user-
supplied post contains any censored keywords.
• /homophone takes a word or a list of words as its input and provides the homo-
phone suggestions of these words as outputs. Once the front-end client detects
one more more censored keywords, it queries the /homophone endpoint for ho-
mophone suggestions to replace these words. The /homophone endpoint return
one of the top 20 homophones with highest frequency scores for each keyword
as possible replacements of the keywords.
I developed the API using the Python programming language and Flask web
framework, which had the advantage of also being written in Python, the same pro-
gramming language that I used to develop all modules of the back-end server. Con-
sequently, I was able to quickly develop the API endpoints by repurposing the code
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of the back-end server.
The API endpoints are currently served through the uWSGI engine, an interface
between web servers and web frameworks for the Python programming language, on
a server hosted on the Georgia Tech network. As the API endpoints are lightweight
and require little processing power and bandwidth, they can be deployed in the same
instance as the back-end server.
5.4.5 Performance
The Social Media Stream Watcher operates at an efficient performance. Each run
of the stream watcher involves scraping the Sina Weibo’s public timeline or Weibo-
scope, segmenting posts into words, and storing the resulting words in the database,
a process that takes approximately 9 seconds to complete. The Weiboscope stream
watcher is slightly faster due to the shorter latency between Georgia Tech’s server
and Weiboscope’s server.
Together, the Censored Keyword Extractor and the Homophone Transformer take
approximately one hour to execute. Since these two modules are executed only once
per day, this execution time does not have a significant impact on the performance
of the whole system.
The API endpoints served through the Flask framework and the uWSGI engine
perform relatively well and without apparent latency. In my experiments, all calls
made to the API endpoints were returned within seconds. Calls to the API endpoints
did not cause any lags in the front-end client.
5.5 Front-end Client Design
To facilitate the use of the back-end server component, a front-end client was devel-
oped. The front-end client performs two major tasks. First, it automatically monitors
the content of the user’s social media posts. Second, it informs the user whether a
post contains any censored-sensitive keywords and offers homophone suggestions as
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replacements for those keywords.
5.5.1 User Interface Design
Based on the results of the formative interview study presented earlier, the design
of the user interface of CENSE needs to be unobtrusive and incorporate seamlessly
with users’ Chinese social media experiences. Therefore, I chose to implement the
front-end client as a Google Chrome browser extension, which users can easily install
on their personal computers. I propose two user interface designs for the web browser
extension as shown in Figure 14.
In the first interface option (Design A), a user is shown two versions of the post
side-by-side: an original version and a suggested version with censored keywords are
replaced by their suggested homophones. The second interface design option (De-
sign B) displays the detected censored keywords and their homophone replacements
alongside the content of the original post.
To evaluate which design of the front-end client interface best streamlines users’
social media experiences, I conducted a user study to evaluate these design proposals.
5.5.2 Design Evaluation
The user study I conducted employed a think-aloud protocol with four participants
to evaluate the design proposals of CENSE’s front-end client. I recruited participants
who were at least 18 years old and are familiar with social media, although not nec-
essarily Chinese social media, to participate in the study. Participants were recruited
through advertisements such as flyers posted on the Georgia Tech campus, mailing
lists of Georgia Tech students, and classified ads. Moreover, a snowball-sampling
technique was also used to recruit additional participants through referral by existing
participants and personal contacts of researchers. All participants were required to
come to a lab location on the Georgia Tech campus at the time of the study. After
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Figure 14: Two designs of the front-end interface.
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were randomly assigned one of two study conditions. The participants assigned to
condition A first viewed Design A and then Design B. Conversely, participants as-
signed to condition B first viewed Design B and then Design A. Participants were
encouraged to talk out loud their opinions and thoughts in reaction to each design
proposal. Participants were also asked the following questions, which were designed
to evaluate the usefulness of and their preferences for each design:
1. What was the difficulty to avoid posting censored-sensitive content? Was there
anything confusing or complicated?
2. How was the experience of posting on social media with this design? Why did
you like (or dislike) it?
3. How was the experience of receiving the feedback from the design? Why did
you like (or dislike) it?
4. Which design do you prefer? Why do you prefer your choice of design?
Because CENSE deals with the sensitive issue of Internet censorship and censor-
ship on social media, I was also interested in determining the participants’ willingness
to use the system to interact with their social media profiles. In addition to questions
intended to evaluate the usefulness of the design and participants’ design preferences,
participants were also asked questions regarding the trustworthiness of the design and
of the overall system:
1. Would you use this system to circumvent censorship? Why or why not?




In this subsection, I present the results of the user evaluation of the interface design.
These results are grouped into four categories. First, participant backgrounds and
censorship experiences are reported to provide context with respect to their famil-
iarity with censorship and content removal on social media. Second, participants’
evaluations of the design are presented. Then, participants’ perceptions of the tool’s
usefulness and effectiveness are reported. Finally, I present trust in the tool as re-
ported by the participants and their willingness to use the tool in their own social
media routines.
5.5.3.1 Censorship Background
Because I had not specifically recruited only Chinese social media users to partici-
pate in this study, I employed the first few questions of the interview study to assess
participants’ understanding of the practice of content removal on social media. All
participants expressed an awareness of censorship practices, and some participants
who were from China and its governing territories had heard of or experienced cen-
sorship on Chinese social media.
There is stuff like this in China. It’s very serious. Like Sina Weibo has
important keyword flags, so it’s not allowed. It’s not really about posting
against the government, it’s basically the use of sensitive words. (P1)
I follow activists/political figures and I know they experience it. (P2)
5.5.3.2 Design
In all sessions, the random assignment of the order of presentation of the two user
interface designs had no impact on the reactions and opinions that the participants
expressed on the two designs.
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Overall, participants preferred Design A over Design B because it presented the
entire post content after censored keywords were replaced with their corresponding
homophones. Design A allowed the participants to see how the final post would look
and allowed participants to easily compare the original and the new, suggested post.
[Design A] allows preview so gives me the option to see if there’s any
hilarious effects. (P1)
I prefer [Design A]; [Design B] is more explicit. [Design A] was more
visually balanced. I’m used to having 2 things (left and right), [it looks]
more balanced. (P4)
Nevertheless, participants pointed out a few flaws of design A, especially when
the post is long. First, the participants commented that design A does not allow for
customization of single words. For instance, P1 stated that, in some cases, he/she
would want to “come up with the words [himself/herself]” to ensure that the final
post does not sound awkward and that it conveyed the meaning he/she intended.
Second, showing the two full-length posts required that participants read through the
suggested posts in their entirety. This process was “too much work for long posts” to
ensure that they sounded fine (P2).
5.5.3.3 Usability and Effectiveness
All participants found the tool useful regardless of their opinions on the interface
design. Specifically, participants found two aspects associated with the tool useful.
First, it could make users who are not already aware of censorship on Chinese social
media become aware that certain keywords they use are being censored. Second, the
tool could help automate the process of replacing words in a post, especially a long
one, to circumvent censorship.
[The tool is] useful to someone who isn’t aware and would care to fix it
with tools like this. (P4)
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Very useful, of course. For some posts that have so many sensitive words.
It may be cumbersome to replace each word. (P1)
Moreover, all participants found the tool to be effective in circumventing censor-
ship on Chinese social media, although some participants stated that the tool would
not completely circumvent the entire censorship process.
This might keep the post up a day more. They are super fast about adding
new keywords. I’m sure this will help but just not sure how much. Defi-
nitely net positive effect but not sure how large. (P2)
One pitfall of the tool that P1 pointed out was that the words suggested as re-
placements for the censored keywords could also be on the censorship agents’ censored
keyword list.
5.5.3.4 Trust in the Tool
All participants stated that they would have reservations about using the tool if they
randomly discovered it on the Internet. Participants would want to do some research
concerning its developers and purpose. In a real-world setting, participants believe
that the tool would not be allowed to be released in China. Thus, if the participants
were to find this tool available while they were in China, they would be more careful
in adopting it.
I just question if it’s allowed for this plugin to exist [in China]. Especially
if it’s tied into social media. But if it’s separate, another platform, I could
try it out and see what is sensitive in a post. (P1)
If this is a random tool [I find on the Internet], I would have to do some
research first. (P2)
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Because the study was conducted in a research setting, once participants were able
to verify that the censorship circumvention tool was developed by a research group at
Georgia Tech, they all stated that they would use the tool once it becomes available.
If something I post is sensitive and someone tries to prevent me I will use
this to check how I could. I wouldn’t want anything preventing me from
posting. (P1)
I would but just because of my deep distrust of the government. I would
be skeptical of how long it would live. If it gets popular, what if it gets
banned? (P2)
5.6 Front-end Client Implementation
Based on the feedback received from the participants in the design evaluation study, I
chose the major design elements from Design A to implement as the CENSE’s front-
end client. However, I did incorporate a few design changes to Design A based on the
feedback I received from participants:
1. Allow edits of the suggested post
2. Explicitly identify the developers of the tool
The front-end client was developed as a Google Chrome extension because users
can easily install this extension on their web browsers. In addition, Google Chrome
extensions make heavy use of Javascript which can be easily adapted for other plat-
forms.
Figure 15 below shows screenshots of the front-end client in the use case where the
user’s post contains censored keywords and the system suggests an alternative post
that replaces censored keywords with corresponding homophones. In this scenario,
the user interaction with the client is as follows:
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1. The user logs in to his/her Sina Weibo homepage. (Figure 15a)
(a) As the Sina Weibo homepage is loading, the CENSE client prefetches the
list of censored keywords from the back-end server.
2. The user begins typing his/her post into Sina Weibo’s input box. (Figure 15b)
3. Within 500 milliseconds (the delay I imposed to permit the user to finish typing),
if the post does not contain any censored keywords, the CENSE client injects a
green light indicator into the Sina Weibo input box, telling the user that his/her
post should be safe from censorship adversaries. (Figure 15b)
4. On the other hand, if the system detects one or more censored keywords in the
user’s post, the CENSE client injects a red light indicator into the Sina Weibo
input box within 500 milliseconds of the user finishing typing. (Figure 15c)
(a) At the same time, the client fetches homophone replacements of the cen-
sored keywords from the back-end server to populate the suggestion sup-
plied in later steps.
5. When the user hovers the mouse cursor over the red light indicator, this indi-
cator transformed into the expand icon, the mouse cursor transforms into the
select cursor to indicates clickability, and the tooltip is shown as a hint to the
user to click on the icon. (Figure 15d)
6. When the user clicks on the hover icon, a panel instantly appears below the
Sina Weibo input box. This panel contains two versions of the post: the origi-
nal version obtained from the Sina Weibo input box and the suggested version
with censored keywords replaced by corresponding homophones. In both ver-
sions of the post, the censored keywords and their homophone replacements are
highlighted. (Figure 15e)
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7. The user can edit the suggested post in the expanded panel to match his/her
preferences. (Figure 15f)
8. Alternatively, the user can ask the interface to generate a new set of homo-
phone replacements by clicking on the “Generate Another Suggestion” button.
Once this button is clicked, the suggested post will be repopulated with the
new version shown in the suggested post with homophones replacing censored
keywords. (Figure 15g)
(a) The front-end client fetches the new set of homophone suggestions from
the back-end server once the user clicks on the “Generate Another Sug-
gestion” button. Although this could introduce some latency into the user
experience, for the back-end server currently running on the Georgia Tech
network, latency is unnoticeable.
9. Once the user is finished with editing the suggested post, the user clicks the
“Accept Suggestion” button. The post in the Sina Weibo input box is replaced
with the suggested post (or the edited version of the suggested post). The user
can then post the post to his/her timeline by clicking the “Weibo” button of
Sina Weibo’s interface.
5.6.1 Performance
The performance of the front-end client is largely based on the performance of the
back-end server and the latency between the machine that the front-end client is
running on and the back-end server instance. As mentioned in the previous section,
the performance of the back-end server does not introduce lags into the performance
of the front-end client. Moreover, since I am running the back-end server on the
Georgia Tech network and am testing the front-end client on a machine that is also
part of the Georgia Tech network, there is little to no latency between the front-end
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(a) Sina Weibo home screen with status update input.
(b) As a user types in the status update box, an indicator that is part of the CENSE
extension will appear at the bottom right of the textbox to indicate whether the post
contains any censored keywords. A green indicator means that the post contains no censored
keywords.
(c) The indicator turns red if the post contains censored keywords.
Figure 15: Screenshots of the CENSE front-end interface as a Google Chrome exten-
sion running on the default interface of Sina Weibo homepage.
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(d) Once the red indicator is hovered, the icon changes to the expand button to give the
user feedback, and a tooltip is displayed to give the user the option to request additional
information and instructions.
(e) When the expand button is clicked, a panel appears below the status update box to
show the user’s post and the suggested alternative. The censored keywords and the replaced
homophones are highlighted for easy detection.
(f) Users can change the suggested post in the textbox if they do not like the suggested
post.
Figure 15: (continued) Screenshots of the CENSE front-end interface as a Google
Chrome extension running on the default interface of Sina Weibo homepage.
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(g) Alternatively, users can request the system to generate another set of homophones to
replace the censored keywords.
(h) Once the user accepts the suggestion, the new status update appears in the status
update box, and the indicator turns green to show that the status no longer contains
censored keywords.
Figure 15: (continued) Screenshots of the CENSE front-end interface as a Google
Chrome extension running on the default interface of Sina Weibo homepage.
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client and the back-end interface, resulting in near-instantaneous user interactions
with the front-end client.
However, if a user is running the front-end client on a machine that has high con-
nection latency to the back-end server, the user experience might not be as seamless.
Nevertheless, since I designed the front-end client to prefetch most of the data needed
for censored keyword detection and keyword replacement suggestions while the Sina
Weibo homepage is loading, the user should experience little delay in interactions
with the CENSE front-end client.
5.7 Evaluation
The ideal method to evaluate the effectiveness and usefulness of this system is to
conduct a deployment study where the system is distributed to participants who are
actual Chinese social media users. Participants then use the system for a period of
time: one month, for example. Afterwards, participants take part in an interview
session or a survey to evaluate two main aspects of the system, its effectiveness and
usefulness. However, I did not conduct such a study as a part of this thesis. In
this section, I explain the reasoning for forgoing the deployment study as well as an
alternate study that can potentially be conducted to evaluate the system.
5.7.1 Arguments against a deployment study
A deployment study is a traditional method in HCI to evaluate the usefulness and
effectiveness of a system. However, in the instance of my system, a deployment
study is not a suitable option due to the sensitivity of the topic of censorship on
Chinese social media. In a traditional user study protocol, in order for participants
to participate in the study, they must first have contact with the researchers during
the recruitment process, after which they download and use the system for one month.
After a month, the participants contact the researchers again to complete a survey
or participate in an interview session. This protocol presents many opportunities for
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communications between participants and researchers to be intercepted by a third
party.
In normal user study protocols where risks involved are not greater than those
present in everyday life, the traditional protocol presents no potential for extraordi-
nary risk to participants. However, in this study, the risks associated with partici-
pants intentionally circumventing censorship on multiple occasions could become a
major concern, because participants in the study are most likely Chinese citizens and
currently reside in China. The Chinese government has deployed advanced mecha-
nisms not only to censor but also to monitor its citizens’ Internet usage [19, 104].
Thus, using the traditional protocol for this study would expose participants to risks
potentially outweighing study benefits. Therefore, I decided against performing a
traditional deployment study.
Nevertheless, the CENSE system has been released as an open-source software
under the MIT license for public use at https://github.com/compsocial/CENSE.
Moreover, the usage log and user data are not being collected to preserve users’
privacy and security.
5.7.2 Alternate plan for system evaluation
With the sensitivity of the topic of censorship on Chinese Internet and the risks
associated with participating in a deployment study of a censorship circumvention
tool in mind, I propose an alternative plan for evaluating the CENSE system. The
CENSE system can be evaluated for its usefulness and effectiveness through a lab
study to avoid the risks associated with posting sensitive content to Chinese social
media.
The lab study would simulate the experiences that participants have to go through
when posting sensitive content on Chinese social media, except that the participants
will not actually posting to Chinese social media. Instead, participants interact with
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a mock-up version of Sina Weibo, which replicates its functionality and interface.
This way, there is no risks associated with posting sensitive content to Chinese social
media in this lab study.
In this lab study, participants will be recruited to come to the lab space during the
time of the study. Participants should be Chinese social media users who are familiar
with Chinese social media platforms and their censorship policy. When participants
arrive at the lab and agree to the consent, the participants will follow the following
study protocol:
1. Participants are briefed that throughout the study, they will interact with a
mock-up version of Sina Weibo, and no data generated during the study will be
transmitted through the Internet to Sina Weibo.
2. Participants are encouraged to talk out loud any thoughts regarding their in-
teractions with the mock-up Sina Weibo that occurred during the study.
3. The participants are presented with a mock-up version on Sina Weibo on a lab
machine.
4. Participants are recommended to interact with the mock-up Sina Weibo to get
familiarize with the interface.
5. Participants are instructed to post a few non-sensitive posts to the mock-up Sina
Weibo. If the participants have troubles constructing posts, the researchers will
provide a list of posts that have neutral content to the participants to post to
the mock-up Sina Weibo.
6. Participants are given a list of posts that contain censored keywords and are
likely to be censored on Sina Weibo.
7. Participants are instructed to post some of these posts to the mock-up Sina
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Weibo with the CENSE system disabled and then with the CENSE system
enabled.
8. Participants are asked to complete a survey to evaluate the usefulness and the
effectiveness of the CENSE system at the end of the study.
Throughout the study, the researchers will take note of the thoughts and com-
ments that the participants made throughout the study. At the end of the study, the
researchers will be available to explain the mechanics of the CENSE system if the
participants have any questions.
By conducting the proposed think-aloud lab study, the usefulness and the effec-
tiveness of the CENSE system can be evaluated by Chinese social media users, the
targeted user group of the system, without compromising the privacy and security of
the participants.
5.8 Circumventing Governmental Attacks
It is undeniable that systems that defy governmental control of the Internet such as
CENSE will be subjected to network surveillance by the government. Moreover, in
the case of CENSE, the Chinese government can easily render the system useless by
simply banning the access to the backend server of the system. In this section, I
explain how the CENSE system is designed to address these two issues.
5.8.1 Defense Against Network Tracing
The communication between the front-end client and the back-end server of CENSE
system leaves a vulnerable point for government surveillance of users of the system.
In this case, the government can monitor data sent over the Internet to identify the
identity of CENSE users. In addition, the government can perform the man-in-the-
middle attack to trick the users through the front-end client that they receive the data
from the back-end server, but the users actually receive the data from the government.
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CENSE is designed to take these possible attacks into account. To get rid of a
possible vulnerable point in the communication between the front-end client and the
back-end server, CENSE users can opt to run their own back-end servers on their
local networks or even on the same machine as the front-end client. This way, the
front-end client and the back-end server do not need to connect to the Internet in
order to communicate with each other. Therefore, the users who use this set up of
the CENSE system can ensure that their use of the system cannot be traced via the
Internet.
5.8.2 Defense Against Access Restrictions
As explained above, the Chinese government can disable the functionality of CENSE
by simply banning access to the backend servers of the system. In this case, the
solution to defend against network tracing described in the previous section will also
solve the problem of access ban to the backend servers. Because users deploy the
backend servers on their own local network, it is impossible for the government to
block access within users’ own local network. Nevertheless, there is still one lingering
problem related to the access ban by the government.
Because the CENSE system relies on two datasets of Chinese social media posts
to properly provide the up-to-date list of censored keywords on Chinese social media
to users. The first dataset is the uncensored posts on Chinese social media which
is easily obtained in China. On the other hand, the second dataset—the censored
posts on Chinese social media—is hard to obtain within China as social media curator
sites such as Weiboscope and Freeweibo are sometimes blocked by the Great Firewall.
Without the second dataset, CENSE will not be able to generate a list of censored
keywords on Chinese social media for the users.
To get around this problem, CENSE can be periodically released to include an
updated list of censored keywords at the time of release. For example, the system
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can release a updated version every three months which includes the list of censored
keywords at the time of release. This way, CENSE users who do not have access to
censored posts on Chinese social media can still use the system with a list of censored
keywords that is “semi-up-to-date”.
5.9 Limitations and Future Work
The primary limitation encountered in my development of the CENSE system, which
involves the sensitive topic of Internet censorship in China, was that an evaluation in-
volving actual users could not be performed as an ethical research practice for reasons
discussed in the previous section. Therefore, the system could not be evaluated via
the real-world use case scenarios. However, I believe that the novelty of this system
provides significant contributions to the field of Social Computing research, and users
of Chinese social media will benefit from its development.
As future work, the CENSE system can be improved in several ways to increase
its performance and adaptability to Chinese social media. First, as we saw previously,
performance of the Censored Keyword Extractor and of the Homophone Transformer
modules were not as efficient as they could be. Currently, execution time of both
modules takes approximately one hour. With better optimization of the TF-IDF
algorithm and the introduction of distributed computing algorithms such as Map
Reduce, the performance of these two modules could be improved.
Second, the Homophone Transformer module currently relies on Da’s character
frequency list of Classical and Modern Chinese [25] to ensure that the generated ho-
mophones use Chinese characters having high frequency in Chinese language texts,
resulting in high reader recognition and high entropy of generated words. However,
Da’s character frequency list is not updated with the language used on Chinese so-
cial media, which differ significantly from the language used in Chinese literature.
Therefore, the system can improve on this aspect by generating its own character
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frequency list based on Chinese social media data obtained from the Social Media
Stream Watcher module. In this way, the generated homophones can be selected to
better match the language used on Chinese social media, improve reader recognition,
and generate increased entropy by matching with more false-positive words on social
media.
To evaluate the CENSE system, I propose an evaluation plan through a lab study
to evaluate the system’s usefulness and effectiveness from the perspective of the users.
While the proposed lab study in the previous section does not replace a deployment
study, the lab study provides an opportunity for the system to be evaluated by the
targeted user group.
My development of CENSE serves as a proof-of-concept that a real-time, auto-
mated Chinese social media censorship circumvention tool is viable and would be
welcomed by Chinese social media users. I hope that the CENSE system will inspire
researchers and designers to create tools to help social media users in China and other
countries with repressive governments to be able to freely express their thoughts and




User participation is crucial to the longevity of online communities and social media
platforms. The research literature has suggested that imposition of Internet cen-
sorship by repressive governments discourages their citizens from contributing user-
generated content to the local platforms [95]. However, this is apparently not the
case with China. There, although access to Western social media platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter is prohibited, local versions such as Sina Weibo and WeChat
flourish in spite of being subject to tight governmental control. In spite of censorship,
there seems to be no lack of content and user participation on Chinese social media.
The work in this thesis revealed that the effects of censorship on Chinese social
media users are predominantly off-platform. In other words, censorship has made
users cautious about the type of content they post on social media and has therefore
suppressed sensitive speech. While on-platform effects are detectable on users’ social
media profiles, these tend to wear off over time.
The primary reason that off-platform censorship effects are more apparent than
on-platform ones is that Chinese social media users lack specific knowledge of what
content is being censored. In my interview study, Chinese social media users stated
that they self-censor out of caution whenever they think their posts could be consid-
ered “sensitive.” Therefore, as a social computing researcher, I saw an opportunity to
develop a tool to aid Chinese social media users in better understanding the censor-
ship mechanism and thus enable them to experience increased freedom of expression
by circumventing censorship.
To circumvent censorship, I developed a non-deterministic algorithm utilizing the
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term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) to generate homophones of
Chinese words. These homophones, created from commonly used Chinese characters
drawn from classical and modern Chinese, have the same sounds as the corresponding
words the homophones are designed to replace and so trick censorship algorithms. In
my experiments, replacing censored keywords in social media posts with their homo-
phones extended the posts’ lifetimes on Sina Weibo by three times compared to the
original posts. Moreover, these transformed posts were readily understandable by
Chinese native speakers. Based on its success, I employed this homophone transfor-
mation algorithm in the design of a real-time system, CENSE, which can not only
enable Chinese social media users to circumvent censorship on social media but also
allow them to better understand their censorship situations.
CENSE is composed of two primary components: a back-end server and a front-
end client. The back-end server handles the logical operations needed to generate
homophones for censored keywords, while the front-end client warns users of censor-
ship and communicates suggested homophones substitutions. The back-end server
first collects censored and uncensored posts from Sina Weibo, the Chinese version
of Twitter, and applies the TF-IDF algorithm on these two datasets to identify cen-
sored keywords. The homophone-generation algorithm then generates using my ho-
mophone replacements for these keywords. The front-end client, a Google Chrome
extension, automatically notifies users when their social media posts contain one or
more censored keywords and, in the presence of censored keywords, suggests homo-
phone replacements. Thus, the system not only gives users the option of neutralizing
the effects of censorship but also allows them to see what specific words and topics
are considered sensitive by their government. CENSE is one of the first automated
systems to both bring transparency to the censorship process and allow users to
circumvent censorship on Chinese social media.
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6.1 Future Research Directions Stemming from this Work
The research in thesis has opened up several future research avenues in the fields of
Social Computing and Social Systems research. In this section, I discuss each of these
and suggest possible issues that can be explored in the future.
6.1.1 Adversarial Social Computing
The research literature in folk theories of social systems suggested that users of social
systems often develop their own theories of how complex personalization algorithms
that are driving these systems work [32]. On a similar note, Chinese social media
users also have their speculations of how the censorship mechanism works as reflected
in the results of the interview study presented in Chapter 3. However, there are two
main differences between a social system’s personalization algorithm and a censorship
mechanism.
1. The censorship adversaries do not want users to understand the censorship
mechanism. Although social systems such as Facebook and Youtube have not
disclosed how exactly their personalization and recommendation algorithms
work, they are up front with how user information are factored into the al-
gorithms [22, 34]. On the other hand, Chinese social media platforms and the
Chinese government have never released any information regarding the censor-
ship mechanism; the only information available are uncovered by researchers
such as [8, 60, 61, 124].
2. Users do not have influence over the censorship mechanism. As mentioned
earlier, user information and actions on social systems often influence user ex-
perience on the systems through personalization algorithms. However, the cen-
sorship mechanism is only affected by current political situations.
I would like to advocate for a branch of Social Computing research that specifically
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concerns issues arising from adversarial social systems. There is a need to gain a better
understanding of how users on current social systems with underlying adversaries
are behaving. In contrast with western social systems, users on adversarial social
systems could develop off-platform behaviors, affecting their online experiences as
demonstrated by Chinese social media users through my interview study in Chapter 3.
6.1.2 Systems Supporting Adversarial Social Media
I began this thesis by asking if the censorship apparatus deployed against sites like
Sina Weibo exerts any user-level costs. It seems intuitive to us in western society,
where free speech is a guarantee that the sporadic enactment of censorship might
drive social media users underground, making them more likely to abandon their
accounts or simply post less frequently. Indeed, if this were the case, one could use it
as ammunition against other countries that might look to borrow the Chinese model.
In other words: “It may work in the short term, but it ends up undermining your
platform in the long term.”
However, this prediction has not turned out to be true with respect to China,
as was shown in the results presented in Chapter 3. Instead, on-platform effects of
censorship appear to be limited, and the user base seems to have largely internalized
caution around sensitive topics. In other words, censorship seems to work exactly as
you would expect the state wants it to work. As a free speech advocate myself, this
gives me pause. Perhaps there are other deterrents to deploying censorship, but de-
creased participation does not seem to be one of them. I worry that, as a consequence,
other countries will deploy similar technologies in the future. The findings from my
research encourage social systems researchers to create technologies that aid users in
understanding, and potentially circumnavigating, elaborate censorship mechanisms,
as I attempted to show in Chapter 4 and 5.
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6.2 Summary of Findings
To summarize, the major findings of this thesis are as follows:
1. The user-level effects of censorship on Chinese social media are intrinsic rather
than extrinsic. Users do not fully understand the censorship mechanism and
deliberately self-censor out of caution. While the user-level effects of censorship
on Chinese social media can be detected on platforms, they tend to wear out
over time.
2. It is possible to circumvent censorship on Chinese social media by substituting
censored keywords with computationally generated homophones. The lifetime of
sensitive posts in which corresponding homophones replace censored keywords
is three times longer than their original, unaltered counterparts. Moreover,
Chinese native speakers can still fully understand the content of the transformed
posts.
3. An automated, real-time system to circumvent censorship on Chinese social me-
dia is possible. In this particular case, I used a homophone generation algorithm
I designed along with a censored keywords detection algorithm to provide users
with current information on censorship on Chines social media. Together with
a front-end client, this system could not only help Chinese social media users
better understand the censorship mechanism but also circumvent it. Chinese
social media users welcomed this idea of a tool that would help them circumvent
censorship on social media. Although they did not see immediate use for such
a tool, they stated that having access to it would be useful.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
The ideology under which this thesis was conducted views repression of political
speech on social media as evil. It is true that not all content on the Internet should
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be published for everyone to see. For example, a selfie promoting unhealthy behavior
such as self-harm or an eating disorder should be moderated to remove the a bad
influence it has on vulnerable population. However, I believe that the Internet can and
should be a medium for healthy conversations on almost any topics. Unfortunately,
this is not the case in China.
Understandably, the Chinese government seeks to control the media to avoid a re-
peat of the devastating events of the 1989 Tiananmen Square student demonstration.
At the same time, I would argue that the government is infringing too greatly on
the rights of Chinese citizens to criticize government officials and government policy.
Basically, the Chinese government is disallowing the key factor needed for a demo-
cratic government: its citizens’ ability to oversee their government. While introducing
democracy to China is not (yet) the most pressing issue for which to advocate, in
several cases, suppressing citizens’ speech has led to abuses of power by government
officials and significant violations of human rights.
It is now up to us as researchers and technology developers to lend a hand in
improving the lives of Chinese Internet users. After all, technology, computers, and
the Internet were created to make people’s lives better and increase the quality of
life. I believe that, through this work done in this thesis, I have done my part in
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